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1. Introduction 
The status of a creditor has always been vitally important in South African law. 
Our law contains numerous provisions – amongst others in the law of insolvency – to 
protect creditors’ rights, that is, the ability of creditors to collect from debtors what 
they are owed. Traditionally secured creditors – that is, creditors who hold some 
form of real security for their claim – rank higher in priority when it comes to 
repayment of their claims by a defaulting debtor, both in individual and collective 
debt enforcement procedures, and as such are, in the vast majority of cases, able to 
recover full or at least partial repayment of their claims.  
Business rescue was introduced into South African law with the commencement 
of the new Companies Act,1 which became effective on 1 May 2011. Business rescue 
is a relatively new collective debt enforcement mechanism applicable to corporate 
debtors. There has been considerable uncertainty with regards to the interpretation of 
some of its provisions, mainly due to important concepts and terms not being 
defined. This uncertainty has extended to the provisions dealing with the extension of 
finance to a corporate debtor after commencement of the business rescue proceedings 
(so-called ‘post-commencement finance’) and the ranking of priority of creditors of 
such corporate debtor during the business rescue proceedings. 
This dissertation will firstly focus on explaining the concept of business rescue, 
with specific emphasis on post-commencement finance. The relevant provisions 
relating to post-commencement finance will be interpreted along the lines of recent 
principles governing statutory interpretation. An apparent conflict in the 
interpretation of these provisions will be identified through specific reference to the 
limited number of judicial pronouncements on this subject matter to date. 
In attempting to resolve the apparent conflict in the interpretation of the relevant 
provisions, this dissertation will then briefly consider the background to business 
rescue in South Africa. The Companies Act itself shall be considered, with specific 
                                                            
1 Act 71 of 2008, hereinafter ‘the Companies Act’. 
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reference to its stated purpose and objects, along with a look at the historical 
development of the specific provisions in question. 
A brief review will then be undertaken of the role and function of real security in 
a collective debt enforcement procedure such as business rescue under South African 
law, with specific reference to the existing distribution rules in insolvency law. A 
comparative review of relevant foreign jurisdictions will then be carried out. This 
dissertation will conclude by providing a suggested approach to the interpretation of 
the ranking of priorities under business rescue. 
2. Post-commencement finance and the protection of property interests 
under business rescue 
The concept of ‘business rescue’ was introduced into the South African law in 
Chapter 6 of the Companies Act. The scheme of the new business rescue provisions 
in the Companies Act was described as follows:2 
‘The general philosophy permeating through the business rescue provisions is 
the recognition of the value of the business as a going concern rather than the 
juristic person itself. Hence the name “business rescue” and not “company rescue”. 
This is in line with modern trend [sic] in rescue regimes. It attempts to secure and 
balance the opposing interests of creditors, shareholders and employees. It 
encapsulates a shift from creditors’ interests to a broader range of interests. The 
thinking is that to preserve the business coupled with the experience and skill of its 
employers may, in the end prove to be a better option for creditors in securing full 
recovery from the debtor. To rescue the business, provision is made to “buy into” the 
procedure without fear of losing such investment in an ailing company by securing 
repayment as a preferential repayment as part of the  
“post-commencement financing”. Post-commencement creditors are thus offered a 
“super-priority” as an incentive to assist the company financially.’ 
Between 1 May 2011 and 31 March 2014, a total of 1 338 business rescue 
notices were filed,3 which equates to an average of just over 38 business rescue 
notices being filed per month. A significant proportion of these filings were invalid 
                                                            
2 Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others v Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) (Pty) Ltd and 
Others, Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) (Pty) Ltd v Kyalami Events and Exhibitions (Pty) Ltd and 
Others [2012] ZAGPJHC 12 (hereinafter ‘Oakdene Square Properties’) at para 12. 
3 Companies and Intellectual Property Commission, Annual Report 2013/2014, 
https://www.dti.gov.za/parliament/2014/CIPC_AR2014.pdf at 10. Accessed on 12 January 2015. 
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and declared nullities – a total of 217, or 16.22 per cent. However, it must be noted 
that the majority of these invalid filings occurred during 2011 and 2012, when 
business rescue was still in its infancy, and for the three months from January to 
March 2014, only three filings out of 94 (or 3.2 per cent) were invalid.4 
This leaves a total of 1 121 cases where business rescue proceedings have 
commenced; of those, a total of 349 entities have had their business rescue 
proceedings ended. Of those, 129 matters may be considered successful in the sense 
that a Notice of Substantial Implementation of a Business Rescue Plan5 has been 
filed with the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC), a success 
rate of about 37 per cent.6 Of course, the argument could also be made that only 11.5 
per cent of the total number of business rescue proceedings that had commenced up 
until 31 March 2014 had resulted in a successful outcome by that date; a recent 
report compiled for the CIPC estimated the success rate for business rescues up until 
31 July 2014 at only 9.4 per cent.7 
It has been observed that post-commencement finance ‘is potentially one of 
the most important, and most problematic, aspects of a successful business rescue 
model.’8 In order to induce potential funders to provide post-commencement finance, 
such post-commencement creditors are offered a ‘super-priority’ over all pre-
commencement unsecured claims against the company.9 Du Preez’s 2012 survey of 
business rescue practitioners and financiers10 identified that concerns and uncertainty 
                                                            
4 Ibid 
5 Companies and Intellectual Property Commission Form CoR 125.3. 
6 Op cit n 3.  
7 Pretorius, Business Rescue Status Quo report: Final report (2015), Business Enterprises at 
University of Pretoria (Pty) Ltd at 33. 
8 Burdette, The development of a modern and effective business rescue model for South Africa: Pre-
consultation working document (2004) at 51. 
9 Bradstreet The new business rescue: will creditors sink or swim? (2011) 128 S. African L.J. 352 at 
360. 
10 Du Preez, The status of post-commencement finance for business rescue in South Africa (MBA 
research project, University of Pretoria (2012)). 
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regarding the priority ranking of post-commencement finance11 was a major obstacle 
to the provision thereof. The ranking of the claims of creditors in business rescue has 
been a fairly contentious and much debated topic.12 
The ranking of creditors’ claims in terms of business rescue proceedings is 
regulated by Section 135 of the Companies Act; more specifically, s 135(3) which 
provides as follows: 
‘After payment of the practitioner’s remuneration and expenses referred to in 
section 143, and other claims arising out of the costs of the business rescue 
proceedings, all claims contemplated –  
(a) In subsection (1) [amounts due and payable to employees after 
commencement of business rescue proceedings] will be treated equally, but 
will have preference over –  
 
(i) all claims contemplated in subsection (2) [general third-party post-
commencement finance], irrespective of whether or not they are 
secured; and 
(ii) all unsecured claims against the company; or 
 
(b) in subsection (2) will have preference in the order in which they were 
incurred over all unsecured claims against the company.’ 
In October 2011, Stein13 published what was described as the ‘first sustained 
treatment’ of the Companies Act.14 This publication also provided, to the author’s 
knowledge, the first interpretation of the ranking of creditors’ claims under business 
rescue:15 
‘Creditors’ claims will therefore rank in the following order of preference –  
                                                            
11 Ibid at p 116. 
12 This is illustrated by, amongst others, Levenstein and Becker, In business rescue, where do you 
rank? http://www.werksmans.com/legal-briefs-view/in-business-rescue-where-do-you-rank/ Accessed 
on 18 January 2015. 
13 Stein & Everingham The New Companies Act Unlocked: A Practical Guide (Cape Town (2011)). 
14 Ibid p v, in the Foreword by Dennis Davis. 
15 Ibid at 421. 
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1. the practitioner for remuneration and expenses, and other persons (including 
legal and other professionals) for costs of the business rescue proceedings; 
2. employees for any remuneration which became due and payable after 
business rescue proceedings began;  
3. secured lenders or other creditors for any loan or supply made after business 
rescue proceedings began (ie, post-commencement finance); 
4. unsecured lenders or other creditors for any loan or supply made after 
business rescue proceedings began (ie, post-commencement finance); 
5. secured lenders or other creditors for any loan or supply made before 
business rescue proceedings began; 
6. employees for any remuneration which became due and payable before 
business rescue proceedings began; and 
7. unsecured lenders or other creditors for any loan or supply made before 
business rescue proceedings began.’ 
As pointed out by Henochsberg,16 this ranking does not seem to be in accordance 
with the wording of s 135, since there is no reference in that section to claims by pre-
commencement secured lenders.17  
The first judgment to deal with the ranking of creditors’ claims in business rescue 
- Merchant West Working Capital Solutions (Pty) Ltd v Advanced Technologies and 
Engineering Company (Pty) Ltd and Another
18
 - was delivered in May 2013, two 
years after the Companies Act came into effect. Kgomo J’s judgment specifically 
refers to Stein’s abovementioned book,20 and sets out the ranking of creditor claims 
as follows:21 
‘Claims rank in the following order of preference: 
1. The practitioner, for remuneration and expenses, and other persons 
(including legal and other professionals) for costs of business rescue 
proceedings. 
2. Employees for any remuneration which became due and payable after 
business rescue proceedings began. 
                                                            
16 Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008, p 478(10)-(12). 
17 However, the equivalent section in the Companies Bill 2007 did refer to such claims – see 4.2 
below. 
18 (13/12406) [2013] ZAGPJHC 109 (10 May 2013). Hereinafter referred to as ‘Merchant West’. 
20 Ibid at para 20 fn 10. 
21 Ibid at para 21. It has been argued that Kgomo J’s remarks in this paragraph were obiter dicta. 
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3. Secured lenders or other creditors for any loan or supply made after business 
rescue proceedings began, ie post-commencement finance. 
4. Unsecured lenders or other creditors for any loan or supply made after 
business rescue proceedings began, ie post-commencement finance. 
5. Secured lenders or other creditors for any loan or supply made before 
business rescue proceedings began. 
6. Employees for any remuneration which became due and payable before 
business rescue proceedings began. 
7. Unsecured lenders or other creditors for any loan or supply made before 
business rescue proceedings began.’ 
It is clear that the ranking set out above is a verbatim copy of the ranking 
suggested earlier by Stein.22 This same ranking was again repeated, verbatim, shortly 
thereafter in a judgment by the same judicial officer – Redpath Mining South Africa 
(Pty) Ltd v Marsden and Others.
23 However, the Redpath Mining judgment 
specifically referred to the protection of secured creditors’ rights as being regulated 
by section 134(3).24 
Section 134(3) reads as follows: 
‘If, during a company’s business rescue proceedings, the company wishes to 
dispose of any property over which another person has any security or title interest, 
the company must –  
(a) obtain the prior consent of that other person, unless the proceeds of the 
disposal would be sufficient to fully discharge the indebtedness protected 
by that person’s security or title interest; and 
 
(b) promptly –  
(i) pay to that other person the sale proceeds attributable to that 
property up to the amount of the company’s indebtedness to that 
other person; or 
(ii) provide security for the amount of those proceeds, to the 
reasonable satisfaction of that other person.’ 
An approach that provides on the one hand for the protection of the rights and 
interests of pre-commencement secured creditors, but on the other hand provides for 
                                                            
22 Op cit n 13, at p 421. 
23 (18486/2013) [2013] ZAGPJHC 148 (14 June 2013), at para 60. Hereinafter referred to as ‘Redpath 
Mining’. 
24 Ibid at para 56. 
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a ranking that allows for an unqualified ‘carving out’ of such secured interests, is 
untenable. It therefore appears that the ranking of creditors provided in Merchant 
West and Redpath Mining is incorrect. 
It is trite that the wording of Chapter 6 of the Companies Act protects pre-
commencement secured claims in a number of instances. Examples of this would 
include the requirement – in most cases
25
 – of obtaining the consent of a person with 
a security or title interest over property of the company if that property is to be sold 
during business rescue proceedings and then promptly paying the proceeds from that 
sale to that person;
26
 and the ability for post-commencement finance to be secured to 
a lender by utilizing any asset of the company to the extent that it is not yet otherwise 
encumbered.27 However, it would appear that the interpretation of s 135(3) in the 
Merchant West and Redpath Mining judgments makes it clear that pre-
commencement secured claims rank after the claims of both secured and unsecured 
post-commencement financiers,28 and a conflict arises with regards to the 
simultaneous interpretation of sections 134 and 135. 
The Constitution provides that, when interpreting any legislation, and when 
developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must 
promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.
29
 Furthermore, the Bill 
of Rights protects the right to property30 and specifically provides that no one may be 
deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and no law may 
permit arbitrary deprivation of property.
31
 Section 25 does not define ‘property’, 
                                                            
25 The exception being instances where the anticipated proceeds from the sale of the encumbered asset 
are sufficient to settle in full the claim by the secured creditor concerned. 
26 S 134(3). 
27 S 135(2). 
28 Levenstein and Becker op cit 12. 
29 Section 39(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter ‘the 
Constitution’). 
30 Section 25 of the Constitution. 
31 S 25(1) of the Constitution. 
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other than stating that it is ‘not limited to land’,32 but it would appear that 
constitutional case law supports a wide enough definition of ‘property’ to include 
real security rights, that is, real rights in property.33 
The primary function of the constitutional protection against arbitrary 
deprivation of property has been described as ‘striking a proportionate balance’ 
between the two functions of protecting existing private property rights and serving 
the public interest.34 Whether there has been a ‘deprivation’ depends on the extent of 
‘any interference with the use, enjoyment or exploitation of private property’, that is, 
involves ‘some deprivation in respect of the person having title or right to or in the 
property concerned’.35 There must be ‘substantial interference or limitation that goes 
beyond the normal restrictions on property use or enjoyment found in an open and 
democratic society’ to constitute deprivation;
36
 and such deprivation will be arbitrary 
when the law of general application imposing that deprivation does not ‘provide 
                                                            
32 S 25(4)(c) of the Constitution. 
33 See First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance [2002] ZACC 5 at para 5 
(arguing that assigning a comprehensive definition to the term ‘property’ is impossible and unwise 
and not necessary in that case) (hereinafter ‘FNB v CSARS’); see also National Credit Regulator v 
Opperman and Others [2012] ZACC 29 (which declared the right to restitution of money paid on the 
basis of unjustified enrichment as ‘property’ for the purposes of section 25); Laugh It Off Promotions 
CC v SAB International (Finance) BV t/a Sagmark International (Freedom of Expression Institute as 
Amicus Curiae) [2005] ZACC 7 and Phumelela Gaming and Leisure Ltd v Gründlingh and Others 
[2006] ZACC 6 (accepting a trade mark to be ‘property’); Law Society of South Africa and Others v 
Minister for Transport and Another [2010] ZACC 25 (which went so far as assuming that even a 
personal claim for loss of earning capacity or support is ‘property’). 
34 FNB v CSARS at para 50. 
35 Ibid at para 57. 
36 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v 
Buffalo City Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC, Local 
Government and Housing, Gauteng, and Others (KwaZulu-Natal Law Society and Msunduzi 
Municipality as Amici Curiae) [2004] ZACC 9 (hereinafter ‘Mkontwana’) at para 32, and referred to 
with approval in Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 
and Others [2010] ZACC 20. 
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sufficient reason for the particular deprivation in question or is procedurally 
unfair.’37 Sufficient reason, inter alia, is to be determined by ‘evaluating the 
relationship between means employed, namely the deprivation in question, and ends 
sought to be achieved, namely the purpose of the law in question.’38 
The Constitutional Court recently confirmed that giving words in a statute 
their ordinary grammatical meaning is a fundamental tenet of statutory interpretation, 
unless doing so results in an absurdity.39 It has furthermore been confirmed in a 
number of decisions by our highest court that our Constitution requires a purposive 
approach to statutory interpretation,
40
 which approach had been followed prior to the 
introduction of the Constitution to a certain extent in the courts.41 As explained by 
Schreiner JA more than sixty years ago:42 
‘Certainly no less important than the oft repeated statement that the words 
and expressions used in a statute must be interpreted according to their ordinary 
meaning is the statement that they must be interpreted in light of their context. But it 
may be useful to stress two points in relation to the application of this principle. The 
first is that “the context”, as here used, is not limited to the language of the rest of 
the statute regarded as throwing light of a dictionary kind on the part to be 
interpreted. Often of more importance is the matter of the statute, its apparent scope 
and purpose, and, within limits, its background.’ 
                                                            
37 FNB v CSARS at para 100. 
38 Ibid 
39 Cool Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard and Another [2014] ZACC 16 at para 28.  
40 See Daniels v Campbell NO and Others [2004] ZACC 14 at paras 22 and 23; Bato Star Fishing 
(Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others [2004] ZACC 15 at para 91 
(hereafter ‘Bato Star’); African Christian Democratic Party v Electoral Commission and Others 
[2006] ZACC 10 at paras 21, 25, 28 and 31; Bertie van Zyl (Pty) Ltd and Another v Minister for Safety 
and Security and Others [2009] ZACC 11 at para 21; and Du Toit v Minister for Safety and Security 
and Another [2009] ZACC 22 at paras 37 and 38. 
41 In the Bertie van Zyl judgment mentioned in n 68, Mokgoro J referred to Jaga v Dönges NO and 
Another; Bhana v Dönges NO and Another 1950 (4) SA 653 (A) at 662-3 and University of Cape 
Town v Cape Bar Council and Another 1986 (4) SA 903 (AD). 
42 In his dissenting judgment in Jaga v Dönges, op cit 39, at 662-3, which was cited with approval by 
Ngcobo J in the Bato Star judgment, op cit 37. 
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The Constitutional Court has held that ‘[t]he emerging trend in statutory 
construction is to have regard to the context in which the words occur, even where 
the words to be construed are clear and unambiguous.’43 Wallis JA recently set out 
the current approach to statutory interpretation as follows: 
‘Interpretation is the process of attributing meaning to the words used in a 
document, be it legislation, some other statutory instrument, or contract, having 
regard to the context provided by reading the particular provision or provisions in 
the light of the document as a whole and the circumstances attendant upon its 
coming into existence. Whatever the nature of the document, consideration must be 
given to the language used in the light of the ordinary rules of grammar and syntax; 
the context in which the provision appears; the apparent purpose to which it is 
directed and the material known to those responsible for its production. Where more 
than one meaning is possible each possibility must be weighted in the light of all 
these factors. The process is objective, not subjective. A sensible meaning is to be 
preferred to one that leads to insensible or unbusinesslike results or undermines the 
apparent purpose of the document. Judges must be alert to, and guard against, the 
temptation to substitute what they regard as reasonable, sensible or businesslike for 
the words actually used. To do so in regard to a statute or statutory instrument is to 
cross the divide between interpretation and legislation; in a contractual context it is 
to make a contract for the parties other than the one they in fact made. The 
“inevitable point of departure is the language of the provision itself”, read in context 
and having regard to the purpose of the provision and the background to the 
preparation and production of the document.’
44
 
It is clear that the common-law rule of excluding evidence of the 
circumstances surrounding the adoption of a statute no longer applies in our law, and 
courts may now refer to acceptable background material, which will include policy 
documents.45 
In attempting to resolve the apparent conflict in the interpretation of sections 
134 and 135, it is therefore necessary to briefly consider the background to the 
‘preparation and production’ of statutory provisions dealing with business rescue in 
South Africa.  
 
                                                            
43 Bato Star supra para 90. 
44 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality [2012] ZASCA 13 at para 18. 
45 Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook, 6th ed (Cape Town (2013)), at p 143. 
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3. Background to business rescue in South Africa 
Judicial management was first introduced in South Africa in 1926,46 one of the 
first jurisdictions in the world to introduce a statutory corporate rescue mechanism. 
Judicial management was left largely unchanged in the Companies Act, 197347 and 
was subject to strong criticism.48 
During the late 1980s the South African Law Commission
49
 (the ‘Commission’) 
reviewed the South African law of insolvency50 under Project 63. Six interim reports 
were submitted and seven working papers were subsequently published for 
comments,
51
 and in 1996 a draft Insolvency Bill and Explanatory Memorandum was 
published as Discussion Paper 6652 and called for comments.53 An Insolvency 
                                                            
46 Via the Companies Act, 1926 (Act 46 of 1926). 
47 Act 61 of 1973. 
48 Olver ‘Judicial Management – A Case For Law Reform’ 1986 Tydskrif vir Hededendaagse 
Romeins-Hollandse Reg 84, who notes that the success rate of judicial management in avoiding an 
ultimate liquidation was less than 20 per cent of the limited number of companies who were eligible to 
make use of the procedure. For more background on the academic criticism against judicial 
management, see Burdette A framework for corporate insolvency law reform in South Africa (LLD 
thesis, University of Pretoria (2002)) and Loubser ‘Judicial management as a business rescue 
procedure in South African corporate law’ 2004 SA Merc LJ 137.  
49 Established by the South African Law Commission Act, 1973 (Act 19 of 1973). 
50 The principal statute of the law of insolvency was (and still is) the Insolvency Act, 1936 (Act 24 of 
1936). The 1936 Act replaced the Insolvency Act, 1916 (Act 32 of 1916) but did not amend it 
drastically. Since its date of commencement on 1 July 1936, the Insolvency Act has been amended by 
fifty subsequent statutes and proclamations. 
51 South African Law Commission, Review of the Law of Insolvency, Discussion Paper 86 Volume 1; 
Project 63 (1999), paragraph 1.1. 
52 South African Law Commission, Draft Insolvency Bill and Explanatory Memorandum Working 
Paper 66; Project 63 (1996) (hereinafter the 1996 draft Bill and explanatory memorandum). 




   
Project Committee54 was appointed to assist with the investigation; at the same time 
the Standing Advisory Committee on Company Law55 (SACCL) agreed to 
investigate a number of subjects, including judicial management, and it was agreed 
that the project committee would take into account the results of the SACCL’s 
research in so far as it related to insolvency.56  
The SACCL authorised the Centre for Advanced Corporate and Insolvency Law 
(CACIL) at the University of Pretoria to embark on a project57 to attempt to merge 
existing liquidation provisions58 into the draft Insolvency Bill, which resulted in a 
Draft Bankruptcy Bill which was submitted for discussion at a symposium in 1998.
59
 
At the time there had been a move towards general acceptance of a business rescue 
culture in comparable systems.60 
                                                            
54 This project committee was chaired by the Honourable Justice R H Zulman, and the researcher 
responsible for investigation was Advocate M B Cronje. This project committee held a total of 27 
meetings during the course of its investigation. 
55 Created in terms of section 18 of the Companies Act, 1973. 
56 The 1996 draft Insolvency Bill and explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5.1.2. 
57 The project leader and researcher was Mr D A Burdette of the University of Pretoria. 
58 As contained in the Companies Act, 1973 (Act 61 of 1973) and the Close Corporations Act, 1984 
(Act 69 of 1984). 
59 Burdette, Final Report Containing Proposals on a Unified Insolvency Act Part 1: Final Report and 
Explanatory Memorandum (2000), paras 1.3 and 1.4. The working document was discussed at a 
symposium held at Procforum (Transvaal Law Society) on 23 October 1998 which was attended by 
approximately 210 delegates. It is of interest to note that Burdette notes that a ‘clear, unanimous signal 
emanated from the symposium – South Africa needs, and wants, a unified system of insolvency law 
which is contained in one consolidated piece of legislation’. 
60 Rochelle ‘Lowering the Penalties for Failure: Using the Insolvency Law as a Tool for Spurring 
Economic Growth; the American Experience, and Possible Uses for South Africa’ 1996 2 TSAR 315; 
Harmer ‘Comparison of Trends in National Law: The Pacific Rim’ 1997 13 Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law 139; Hunter ‘The Nature and Functions of a Rescue Culture’ 1999 Journal of 
Business Law 491. 
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At this symposium, a paper on business rescue was delivered by Rajak and 
Henning61 which ‘gave an excellent exposition of…judicial management’ and ‘made 
valid suggestions in respect of who should oversee a process of business rescue.’62 A 
paper was also delivered by Smits63 in which he suggested that South Africa should 
consider a business rescue regime similar to that provided for under Chapter 11 of 
the United States Bankruptcy Code.
64
  
The symposium was followed by a series of workshops dealing with the technical 
intricacies of the Bill.65 Three proposals for the future of South African business 
rescue emerged: the first, by Kloppers,
66
 argued for the retention of judicial 
management, but with reforms67; while the second proposal by Nel68 and a third 
proposal based on the model suggested by Smits69 both argued for automatic stays as 
their basis and were debtor-friendly in approach. 
                                                            
61 Later published as Rajak & Henning ‘Business Rescue for South Africa’ (1999) 116 SALJ 262. 
62 Burdette op cit note 8, fn 195. 
63 Anthony J. Smits was a South African who had emigrated to the United States and had become an 
international bankruptcy expert working for a Connecticut-based law firm called Hebb & Gitlin.  
64 His paper was later published as Smits ‘Corporate administration: a proposed model’ 1999 De Jure 
85. Smits realized that the provisions of Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code could not simply be 
wholesale transplanted to South African law and suggested adapting them to the South African 
context.  
65 Burdette, op cit note 8, para 1.5. These workshops were held at the University of Pretoria from 7 to 
10 December 1998, and were attended by approximately sixty delegates. 
66 Pieter Kloppers of the University of Stellenbosch. 
67 Kloppers ‘Judicial management – A corporate rescue mechanism in need of reform?’ 1999 Stell LR 
426. 
68 Basil Nel, at the time the head of PriceWaterhouseCoopers’ liquidation division. Nel’s initial 
proposals were described as ‘radical’ but he eventually compiled a ‘more tempered version’ in 
conjunction with insolvency practitioner Chris Edeling – Burdette op cit note 8, para 24.2. 
69 Legislative provisions based on Smits’s proposals were drafted by Burdette and finalized with the 




   
The Insolvency Project Committee’s draft Insolvency Bill and CACIL’s draft 
Bankruptcy Bill were then discussed at a conference70 the following year. The three 
proposals for business rescue mentioned above were also discussed, but no 
consensus could be reached on which one was appropriate71. It was suggested72 that a 
report combining the proposals of both the Insolvency Project Committee and 
CACIL be lodged with the Commission to ensure the consideration of a unified 
Insolvency Act by the Commission in early 2000.73  
Since no proposal could be finalized in respect of business rescue provisions74, 
CACIL’s final report instead suggested retaining judicial management with some 
minor amendments75 ‘until a proper business rescue regime can be implemented.’76 
The Honourable Justice Mahomed submitted the Commission’s report on the 
review of the law of insolvency and the draft Insolvency Bill
77
 to the Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Development on 23 February 2000. The draft Bill, under 
Chapter 24, provided for the retention of judicial management with the minor 
                                                            
70 Burdette, op cit note 8, paras 1.6 and 1.7. The conference took place at Eskom Conference Centre 
on 6 October 1999, for which 230 delegates registered. 
71 Ibid para 24.6. 
72 The suggestion was made by Judge of Appeal Ralph Zulman and Professor Michael Katz, with the 
approval of the delegates present – Burdette op cit note 8, para 1.12. 
73 Due to time constraints it proved impossible to have a joint report ready for distribution in time, and 
instead references to various working papers were utilised. 
74 Burdette op cit note 8, para 24.9. 
75 These amendments included making judicial management applicable not just to companies but to 
other juristic persons as well, and amending the burden of proof for obtaining a judicial management 
order from ‘reasonable probability’ to ‘reasonable possibility’. 
76 Burdette op cit note 8, para 24.10. 
77 South African Law Commission, Report on the Review of the Law of Insolvency; Project 63 (2000). 
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amendments suggested by CACIL. In 200378 the Cabinet of South Africa approved 
the draft Insolvency and Business Recovery Bill, the name given to the Bill when it 
was envisaged that business rescue provisions for corporate entities would be 
included as part of a unified Insolvency Act.79  
The Insolvency and Business Recovery Bill was submitted to Parliament for 
consideration during the 2003 session, but consideration thereof was delayed as a 
result of uncertainty about the department responsible for developing modern 
business rescue provisions.80 
In July 2003 the Department of Trade and Industry
81
 (‘DTI’) convened a Local 
and International Roundtable on Company Law Reform in Johannesburg, which 
constituted the official launch of the new company law reform process in South 
Africa.
82
 The intention of the DTI was to undertake a comprehensive overhaul – or 
‘fundamental revamp’ - of South African company law, and to do so by formulating 
a policy framework to guide the reform process.83 A relatively simple process was 
                                                            
78 This was announced in the statement on the Cabinet meeting of 5 March 2003: 
http://www.gcis.gov.za/content/newsroom/media-releases/cabinet-statements/statement-cabinet-
meeting-5-march-2003 Accessed on 7 January 2015. 
79 Calitz ‘Some thoughts on state regulation of South African insolvency law’ 2011 44 De Jure 290, fn 
87. 
80 National Economic Development and Labour Council’s Labour Market Chamber, Nedlac Interim 
Report on the Insolvency and Recovery Bill (2013), paras 2.2 and 3.1. 
81 By way of Astrid Ludin, then Deputy Director-General of the Consumer and Corporate Regulation 
Division (CCRD) within the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). 
82 Mongalo (ed), Modern Company Law for a Competitive South African Economy (2010) xiv. There 
were eleven original participants at this roundtable: Astrid Ludin; James J. Hanks Jr. (a US 
commercial lawyer); Professor Samuel C. Thompson (UCLA School of Law); Nigel Boardman (a 
UK-based corporate and commercial solicitor); Dines Gihwala (chairman of Hofmeyr Herbstein and 
Gihwala); Judge Basheer Waglay (a Judge in the Labour Court and a member of the SACCL); Nicky 
Newton-King (Deputy CEO of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange); Judge Lucy Mailulu (Judge of the 
High Court and vice-chairperson of the SACCL); Tshepo H. Mongalo (project manager); Norman 
Manoim (Competition Tribunal); and Dr. Alistair Ruiters (Director-General of the DTI). 
83 Ibid xiv-xv. 
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clearly envisaged by the DTI, as evidenced by the following statement made at the 
roundtable: 
‘Corporate law reform processes that have been adopted around the world have 
been quite different from the one we envisage in South Africa. What we envisage is a 
fairly simple process in terms of formulating a policy and legislation without a lot of 
committees. I think in many countries, in the UK recently, there have been task teams 
and various committees appointed. That is not what we envisage here, but the 
emphasis will be on consultation on both the policy document and on the 
legislation.’
84 
The policy formulation process was led by the project manager who was assisted 
by a chief policy adviser85 and a chief drafter.86 In addition to this core of three, there 
were six working groups that each had its own specific priority area to consider.87 
The working groups recommended broad principles to the core team for drafting of 
provisions; once the principles were formulated they were circulated for comment to 
specialists divided into a local reference team
88
 and an international reference team
89
. 
Broad principles for company law reform had emerged from the initial roundtable; 
one of these was that judicial management was failing the local economy.90 
In May 2004 the DTI’s company law reform process had formulated its policy 
framework.91 Policy on corporate rescue and judicial management included the 
                                                            
84 Mongalo op cit 81 xv at fn 6. 
85 Judge Dennis Davis. 
86 Phillip Knight, a Canadian plain-language drafting expert and legal practitioner. 
87 Mongalo op cit 81 at xvi. 
88 Many members of the local reference team were also members of the SACCL – supra. 
89 The international reference team included four from the United States, three from the United 
Kingdom and one from Australia. 
90 Mongalo op cit 81 at xvii; Le Roux Hotel Management (Pty) Ltd v E Rand (Pty) Ltd (2001) 1 All 
SA 223 (C) at 238, where Josman J referred to judicial management as ‘a system which has barely 
worked since its initiation in 1926’. 




   
following direct quote from the paper delivered by Rajak and Henning92 at the 
symposium on insolvency law reform six years previously: 
‘…all modern corporate rescues are united on one matter, the absence which, 
possibly more than anything else, has helped to bring South Africa’s judicial 
management to its present perceived impotence. This is the recognition that the 
agreed plan by which the future relations between the debtor and its creditors will be 
governed may well include the reduction of the debtor’s overall indebtedness. To 
insist, as the South African rescue provision does, that a protective moratorium is 
available only where “there is a reasonable probability that if [the debtor] is placed 
under judicial management, it will be able to pay its debts or to meet its 
obligations”, is to ignore the well-nigh universal reality of creditors being prepared, 
for their own benefit, to forgive part of the debt. It is frequently the case that a 
creditor will benefit far more from having the debtor back in the market place than 
from suing the debtor into extinction. A radically new rescue provision should 
provide a mechanism under which a specified majority of creditors can approve a 




The policy document also indicated that ‘[t]his recommendation will be taken 
into consideration in the law review process in order to create a system of corporate 
rescue appropriate to the needs of a modern South African economy. In particular, 
the provisions of the US Chapter 11 will be considered. It must further be tested 
against the work already done by the Department of Justice in the proposed 
Insolvency and Business Rescue [sic] Bill.’94 (Emphasis added.) 
The above-mentioned guidelines were published in the Government Gazette on 
23 June 2004.
95
 This was followed by a series of public consultation sessions in all 
nine provinces, along with the guidelines being tabled within the National Economic 
Development and Labour Council’s Trade and Industry Chamber for consideration.96 
                                                            
92 See note 59. 
93 Ibid, at para 4.6.2. 
94 Op cit n 90 at paragraph 4.6.2. 
95 South African Company Law for the 21st Century: Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform GN 1183 
in Government Gazette No 26493 of 23 June 2004. 
96 Mongalo op cit n 81 at xxii. 
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Following the report by a Ministerial Committee of Enquiry into the Liquidations 
Industry appointed by the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development97, the 
appointment of an Inter-Departmental Task Team was approved by Cabinet in June 
200598 to report, among others, on business rescue and judicial management. At the 
time, both the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (in the form of 
its insolvency law reform project) and the Department of Trade and Industry (in the 
form of its company law reform project) were involved in proposing a new business 
rescue regime; the task team concluded that the DTI was best-placed to take 
responsibility for business rescue.
99
 
The first exposure draft of the new Companies Bill was finalized in April 2006; 
after internal consultation within the DTI, focus group consultations with relevant 
stakeholders in the labour, business and civil society sectors took place in July 2006, 
whereupon the Bill was finalized for submission to the Minister of Justice and 
Cabinet to obtain approval for publication.100 The Companies Bill, 2007 (the ‘2007 
Bill’) was approved by Cabinet for public comment in February 2007
101
 and 
published shortly thereafter.102 
                                                            
97 The Committee was appointed to investigate ‘systemic problems’ within the liquidation industry.  
98 Announced in the statement on the Cabinet meeting of 22 June 2005: 
http://www.gcis.gov.za/content/newsroom/media-releases/cabinet-statements/statement-cabinet-
meeting-22-june-2005 Accessed on 7 January 2015. 
99 By this time the DTI’s Company Law Reform Project had already started the process of legislative 
drafting of the new Companies Bill, which included new business rescue provisions. 
100 Mongalo op cit n 81 at xxiii. 
101 See the statement on the Cabinet meeting of 7 February 2007: 
http://www.gcis.gov.za/content/newsroom/media-releases/cabinet-statements/statement-cabinet-
meeting-7-february-2007 Accessed on 7 January 2015. 
102 Companies Bill, 2007 GN 166 in Government Gazette No 29630 of 12 February 2007. The 
business rescue provisions were contained under Chapter 6 of the Bill. 
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The publication of the 2007 Bill elicited considerable comment.103 The DTI 
instructed the drafting team to revise the 2007 Bill in a manner that would continue 
to give effect to the identified policy guidelines, but address all the issues and 
concerns that had been raised as far as practically possible. 
A revised Bill – the Companies Bill, 2008 – was introduced into Parliament 
during June 2008
104
 and formally published by the DTI for general comment as Bill 
61 of 2008.105 Following public hearings within the Portfolio Committee on Trade 
and Industry, the National Assembly adopted the new Companies Bill with minor 
amendments on 19 November 2008 as the Companies Bill B61D of 2008.
106
 The Bill 
was eventually assented to by the President and gazetted on 9 April 2009.107  
Loubser108 has pointed out that, despite the substantial changes to South African 
corporate law as a result of the new Companies Bill – including the introduction of a 
brand-new business rescue mechanism – the Bill was introduced into Parliament only 
sixteen months after the publication of the first draft of the Bill, and was approved 
barely five months later.
109
 When the 1973 Companies Act was promulgated, it was 
the result of a detailed report by the Van Wyk de Vries Commission explaining and 
substantiating every single proposed provision; this is not the case for the 2008 
Companies Act and Loubser was proved to be rightly concerned that there would be 
problems of interpretation, especially relating to the business rescue provisions.110 
                                                            
103 Mongalo op cit n 81 at xxiv notes that, aside from oral submissions received during public 
consultation sessions, the DTI received over 3,000 written pages in comments. 
104 Notice of Introduction of a Bill into Parliament GN 677 in Government Gazette No 31104 of 30 
May 2008. 
105 On 27 June 2008. 
106 Mongalo op cit n 81 at xxv. 
107 Companies Act 71 of 2008 GN 421 in Government Gazette No 32121 of 9 April 2009. 
108 Loubser Some comparative aspects of corporate rescue in South African company law (LLD 
thesis, UNISA) (2010) at 5. 
109 Of course, it was the stated intention of the DTI to keep the law reform process relatively simple. 
110 Loubser op cit 107 at 6. 
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This view has been endorsed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in several recent 
judgments requiring interpretation of business rescue provisions.111 
4. The Companies Act 
The preamble to the Act describes its purpose as, inter alia, ‘to provide for 
efficient rescue of financially distressed companies’. It furthermore states that one of 
the purposes of the Act is to ‘provide for the efficient rescue and recovery of 
financially distressed companies, in a manner that balances the rights and interests of 
all relevant stakeholders.’112  
There is no explanatory memorandum to the Companies Act, but an explanatory 
memorandum was provided by the DTI to the 2007 Companies Bill. This 
memorandum referred to the five-point statement of economic growth objectives113 
which had been set out in the DTI’s 2004 policy document,
114
 which proposed ‘that 
company law should promote the competitiveness and development of the South 
African economy’ by: 
1. Encouraging entrepeneurship and enterprise development, and consequently, 
employment opportunities by –  
(a) simplifying the procedures for forming companies; and 
(b) reducing costs associated with the formalities of forming a 
company and maintaining its existence. 
2. Promoting innovation and investment in South African markets and 
companies by providing for –  
(a) flexibility in the design and organization of companies; and 
(b) a predictable and effective regulatory environment. 
                                                            
111 See, inter alia, Leach JA in African Banking Corporation of Botswana v Kariba Furniture 
Manufacturers & others [2015] ZASCA 69 at para 43 (“I do not believe it is unfair to comment that 
many of the provisions of the Act relating to business rescue, and s 153 in particular, were shoddily 
drafted and have given rise to considerable uncertainty.”) and Wallis JA in Panamo Properties (Pty) 
Ltd v Nel and Another NNO [2015] ZASCA 76 at para 1 (“These commendable goals are 
unfortunately being hampered because the statutory provisions governing business rescue are not 
always clearly drafted. Consequently they have given rise to confusion as to their meaning and 
provided ample scope for litigious parties to exploit inconsistencies and advance technical arguments 
aimed at stultifying the business rescue process or securing advantages not contemplated by its broad 
purpose.”). 
112 S 7(k) of the 2008 Companies Act. 
113 Op cit n 101 at page 3. 
114 Op cit n 94. 
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3. Promoting the efficiency of companies and their management. 
4. Encouraging transparency and high standards of corporate governance. 




The explanatory memorandum to the 2007 Bill furthermore states that, ‘in 
accordance with the reform objectives and specific goals, Chapter 6 proposes 
replacing the existing regime of judicial administration of failing companies with a 
modern business rescue regime, largely self-administered by the company, under 
independent supervision within constraints set out in the chapter, and subject to 
court intervention at any time on application by any of the stakeholders. In 
particular, the Chapter recognizes the interests of shareholders, creditors and 
employees, and provides for their respective participation in the development and 
approval of a business rescue plan.’
116
 
The Companies Act does not define ‘stakeholder’, but Chapter 6 does define an 
‘affected person’ of the company in question as being either a shareholder, a creditor, 
or an employee117 (or representative of the employee such as a registered trade 
union).
118
 ‘Relevant stakeholders’, as referred to in section 7 of the Act, therefore 
appears to include any and all affected persons. By inference, then, a stated purpose 
of the Act is to provide for the efficient rescue and recovery of financially distressed 
companies in a manner that balances the rights and interests of affected persons, 
being shareholders, creditors and employees. 
In the 2007 Companies Bill, the Chapter 6 business rescue provisions were 
contained in sections 130 to 157. For the purposes of this dissertation, sections 137 
(protection of property interests) and 138 (post-commencement finance) are relevant. 
The 2008 Companies Bill, tabled in the National Assembly sixteen months later, saw 
the business rescue provisions then being contained in sections 128 to 155. The 
relevant provisions mentioned above were renumbered to sections 134 and 135; both 
sections were considerably amended from the earlier bill. The final form of the 
Companies Act, as promulgated, included further, minor, amendments. With the 
promulgation of the Companies Amendment Act 3 of 2011, a number of provisions 
                                                            
115 Ibid at p 10. 
116 Op cit n 101 at p 13. 
117 Directors of the company would be included under the definition of employees. 
118 Section 128(1)(a). 
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were, yet again, amended. Section 134(3) remained unchanged, but section 135(3) – 
the provision dealing with the priority of claims under business rescue proceedings – 
was amended, although not materially.119 
4.1 Protection of property interests 
In its first guise as section 137 under the 2007 Companies Bill, the protection of 
property interests clause read as follows: 
(1) … 
(2) … 
(3) If, during a company’s business rescue proceedings, the company wishes 
to dispose of any property over which another person has any security or 
title interest, the company must promptly -   
 
(a) pay to that person the sale proceeds attributable to that property; 
or 
 
(b) provide security for the amount of those proceeds, reasonably 
satisfactory to that person. 
The 2008 Companies Bill saw the relevant provision renumbered to section 134, 
which now read as follows: 
(1) … 
(2) … 
(3) If, during a company’s business rescue proceedings, the company disposes of 
any property over which another person has any security or title interest, the 
company must  –  
 
(a) obtain the prior consent of that other person, unless the proceeds of the 
disposal would be sufficient to fully discharge the indebtedness protected 
by that person’s security or title interest; and 
                                                            
119 The only difference being the substitution of the word ‘costs’ with the word ‘expenses’ in s 135(3). 
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(b) promptly –  
(i) pay to that other person the sale proceeds attributable to that 
property up to the amount of the company’s indebtedness to that 
other person; or  
(ii) provide security for the amount of those proceeds, to the 
reasonable satisfaction of that other person. 
The final form of the provision remained effectively unchanged.120 It would 
appear that the provision was amended by the legislature to provide even greater 
protection of the interests of a person holding a security or title interest in the 
property of a company by adding the requirement of obtaining prior consent from 
that person should the anticipated proceeds of the disposal of that asset be 
insufficient to fully discharge the indebtedness protected by that security or title 
interest.121 
As pointed out by Henochsberg,
122
 no definition of the term ‘security or title 
interest’123 as used in subsection 134(3) is provided by the Companies Act. However, 
the winding-up of a company subsequent to business rescue proceedings is 
contemplated as a possibility in several sections of Chapter 6.
124
 The transitional 
arrangements to the Companies Act provide that, despite the repeal of the 1973 
Companies Act, Chapter 14 of that Act125 continues to apply with respect to the 
                                                            
120 The phrase ‘the company disposes’ was substituted with the phrase ‘the company wishes to 
dispose’. 
121 S 134(3)(a). 
122 Op cit n 16 at p 478(8). 
123 The term ‘security interest’ is defined in § 51A of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 as, 
amongst others, ‘a charge, lien or pledge’. 
124 Inter alia, ss 129(6), 131(8(a), 132(2)(a)(ii), 135(4), 140(4), 141(2)(a)(ii), 145(4)(b), 150(2)(a)(iii), 
150(2)(b)(vi), 155(3)(a)(iii) and 155(3)(a)(vi). 
125 Chapter 14 consists of sections 337 to 426 and deals with the winding-up of companies. 
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winding-up and liquidation of companies under the Companies Act.126 Section 342 
of the 1973 Companies Act provides that, in every liquidation of a company ‘the 
assets shall be applied in payment of the costs, charges and expenses incurred in the 
winding-up and…the claims of creditors as nearly as possible as they would be 
applied in payment of the costs of sequestration and the claims of creditors under the 
law relating to insolvency…’
127
  
The Insolvency Act128 defines ‘security’ as follows: ‘[i]n relation to the claim 
of a creditor of an insolvent estate, means property of that estate over which the 
creditor has a preferent right by virtue of any special mortgage,
129
 landlord’s legal 
hypothec, pledge or right of retention.’
130 This definition is uncontroversial and has 
been part of the South African law for a considerable period of time. It is submitted 
that there are no impediments to equating ‘security or title interest’, as used in s 
134(3), to this definition of ‘security’, and to refer to indebtedness protected by such 
security or title interest as a secured claim. By the same reasoning, where 
indebtedness is not likewise protected by such security or title interest, it would 
constitute an unsecured claim.  
The above interpretation in the context of business rescue was approved by 
Fourie J in SARS v Beginsel
131
 where the learned judge confirmed that the 
categorization of creditors into secured and unsecured ‘is uncontentious and well-
                                                            
126 Item 9 of Schedule 5 to the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
127 S 342(1) of the 1973 Companies Act. 
128 Act 24 of 1936, hereinafter ‘the Insolvency Act’. 
129 ‘Special mortgage’ is defined to mean a mortgage bond hypothecating any immovable property or 
a notarial mortgage bond hypothecating specially described movable property in terms of section 1 of 
the Security by Means of Moveable Property Act, 1993 (Act 57 of 1993), or such a notarial mortgage 
bond registered before 7 May 1993 in terms of section 1 of the Notarial Bonds (Natal Act, 1932 (Act 
18 of 1932), but excluded any other mortgage bond hypothecating moveable property – section 2 sv of 
the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. 
130 Section 2 sv of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. 
131 The Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Beginsel and Others (15080/12) [2012] 
ZAWCHC 194 (31 October 2012), hereinafter ‘SARS v Beginsel’. 
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known in legal parlance. Secured creditors are those who hold security over the 
company’s property, such as a lien or mortgage bond. Unsecured creditors are those 
whose claims are not secured, including concurrent creditors. The unsecured 
creditors are either preferent or concurrent creditors. The term “preferent creditor”, 
used in the wide sense, refers to any creditor who has a right to receive payment 
before other creditors. To this extent, a secured creditor also qualifies as a preferent 
creditor. However, the term “preferent creditor” is normally reserved for a creditor 
whose claim is not secured, but who nevertheless ranks above the claims of 
concurrent creditors (whose claims are also unsecured). Such preferent creditors are 
commonly referred to as “unsecured preferent creditors” and are mentioned in 
sections 96-102 of the Insolvency Act.’
132  
Furthermore, the Insolvency Act defines ‘preference’ as follows: ‘in relation 
to any claim against an insolvent estate, means the right to payment of that claim out 
of the assets of the estate in preference to other claims; and ‘preferent’ has a 
corresponding meaning.’
133
 The intended practical effect of section 134(3) would 
therefore appear to be analogous to the practical effect of a secured claim in terms of 
the Insolvency Act.  
4.2 Post-commencement finance 
In the 2007 Companies Bill, section 138 was the relevant provision dealing with 
post-commencement finance and read as follows: 
(1) To the extent that money becomes due and payable by a company to an 
employee during the company’s business rescue proceedings, but is not paid 
to the employee –  
(a) the money is deemed to be post-commencement financing, irrespective 
whether it has been approved by other creditors; and 
(b) will be paid in the order of preference set out in subsection (3)(a). 
                                                            




   
(2) Any amount of financing obtained by the company during its business rescue 
proceedings, other than as contemplated in subsection (1), will be paid in the 
order of preference set out in subsection 3(b). 
(3) After payment of the supervisor’s remuneration and costs referred to in 
section 146, and other claims arising out of the costs of the business rescue 
proceedings, all claims contemplated –  
(a) in subsection (1) will have preference in the order in which they were 
incurred over –  
(i) all claims contemplated in subsection (2); and 
(ii) all secured and unsecured claims against the company; or 
(b) in subsection (2) will have preference in the order in which they were 
incurred over all unsecured claims against the company. 
(4) If business rescue proceedings are superseded by a liquidation order, the 
preference conferred in terms of this section will remain in force except to the 
extent of any claims arising out of the costs of liquidation. 
By the time that the Companies Act had come into effect, the relevant provision 
had been renumbered to section 135 and had been significantly amended: 
(1) To the extent that any remuneration, reimbursement for expenses or other 
amount of money relating to employment becomes due and payable by a 
company to an employee during the company’s business rescue proceedings, 
but is not paid to the employee –  
(a) the money is regarded to be post-commencement financing; and 
(b) will be paid in the order of preference set out in subsection 3(a). 
(2) During its business rescue proceedings, the company may obtain financing 
other than as contemplated in subsection (1), and any such financing –  
(a) may be secured to the lender by utilizing any asset of the company to the 
extent that it is not otherwise encumbered; and 
(b) will be paid in the order of preference set out in subsection (3)(b). 
(3) After payment of the practitioner’s remuneration and expenses referred to in 
section 143, and other claims arising out of the costs of the business rescue 
proceedings, all claims contemplated –  
(a) In subsection (1) will be treated equally, but will have preference over –  
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(i) all claims contemplated in subsection (2), irrespective whether or 
not they are secured; and 
(ii) all unsecured claims against the company; or 
(b) in subsection (2) will have preference in the order in which they were 
incurred over all unsecured claims against the company. 
(4) If business rescue proceedings are superseded by a liquidation order, the 
preference conferred in terms of this section will remain in force, except to 
the extent of any claims arising out of the costs of liquidation. 
It is of interest to note the historical evolution of this provision. First and 
foremost it appears that, per the 2007 Companies Bill, so-called deemed employee 
post-commencement finance was specifically intended to have priority in the order in 
which they were incurred
134
 over general third-party post-commencement claims – 
irrespective of whether secured or not – as well as all (other) secured and unsecured 
claims against the company. Subsection 3(a) refers only to the priority of deemed 
employee post-commencement finance, whereas subsection 3(b) refers only to the 
priority of general third-party post-commencement finance. On a proper construction 
of section 138 of the 2007 Companies Bill, it would appear that the ranking of 
priorities in business rescue was intended to be as follows: 
1. The practitioner’s remuneration and expenses; 
2. Deemed employee post-commencement finance in the order in which they 
were incurred; 
3. Secured pre-commencement claims;135 
4. Secured post-commencement finance; 
5. Unsecured post-commencement finance in the order in which they were 
incurred; 
6. Employee (unsecured) claims for remuneration that arose prior to business 
rescue proceedings commencing;136 
                                                            
134 Or what appears to embrace the principle of prior in tempore, potior in iure. 
135 This is due to subsection 3(b) specifically referring only to unsecured claims. 
136 Due to section 147(1) of the 2007 Companies Bill, which identifies employees in respect of such 
pre-commencement claims as a ‘senior unsecured creditor’ of the company. 
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7. Other unsecured pre-commencement claims. 
The provision was substantially amended in the 2008 Company Bill. More 
specifically, subsection 3(a) – which defines the priority of deemed employee post-
commencement finance – was amended to include only unsecured claims (that is, the 
reference to ‘secured claims’ in subsection 3(a)(ii) was deleted). This amendment is 
significant, in that it implies that the legislature specifically intended to remove 
secured (pre-commencement) claims from the operation of the subsection.137 
Furthermore, by the time that the Act was promulgated, subsection 3(a) had been 
further amended in that deemed employee post-commencement claims would be 
treated equally,138 and not paid in the order in which they were incurred. 
A construction of the final version of section 135 as set out in the Companies Act 
appears to indicate that the ranking of priorities in business rescue should be as 
follows: 
1. The practitioner’s remuneration and expenses;139 
2. Secured pre-commencement claims; 
3. Deemed employee post-commencement finance, pari passu; 
4. Secured post-commencement finance; 
5. Unsecured post-commencement finance in the order in which they were 
incurred; 
6. Employee (unsecured) claims for remuneration that arose prior to business 
rescue proceedings commencing;140 
7. Other unsecured pre-commencement claims. 
                                                            
137 It would appear that the credit provider lobby must have provided considerable opposition to the 
initial wording.  
138 Which can be equated to the principle of pari passu repayment in insolvency law. 
139 There is little doubt that the practitioner’s remuneration constitute an absolute super-priority as a 
result of the wording of s 143(5), which provides that, to the extent that the practitioner’s 
remuneration and expenses are not fully paid, the practitioner’s claim for those amounts will rank in 
priority before the claims of all other secured and unsecured creditors. 
140 Section 144(2) of the 2008 Companies Act. 
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The special protection afforded to employees’ claims is of course consistent with 
stated policy grounds141 and is not new to South African insolvency law,142 nor is it 
without precedent in foreign jurisdictions.143 In France, the super-preference 
employee claim is limited to the last 60 working days’ pay (subject to a maximum of 
twice the wage used as the basis for calculating social security contributions per 
working month) plus the allowance for leave not taken (up to 30 days), plus also 
(where applicable) compensation in lieu of notice.144 There is no similar qualification 
of the scope of deemed employee post-commencement finance in the Companies 
Act.
145
 Furthermore, the ‘super-preference’ in favour of employee claims in France 
does not have priority over secured claims, with the following reason provided: in 
the case of a secured claim, the asset pledged as security for the repayment of the 
debt is – factually or notionally – repossessed. The secured creditor asserts vis-à-vis 
the employee creditor not so much a preference based on his secured claim, but 
rather on the right to retain (even if only notionally) an object which – theoretically – 
remains in his possession.
146
 
                                                            
141 See, for example, Claassen J in Oakdene Square Properties at para 15. 
142 See section 98A of the Insolvency Act. 
143 Yemin and Bronstein (eds) The protection of workers’ claims in the event of the employer’s 
insolvency (1991) Labour-Management Relations Series 76, International Labour Organisation, pp 29-
32 at 30 which indicates that so-called ‘super-preferences’ in favour of employees have been 
introduced in France, Spain, Brazil, Ecador, Mexico, Peru, Benin, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, 
Guinea, Algeria, Tunisia and the Philippines. It should be noted that the scope of such super-
preference is limited in almost all of these jurisdictions up to a maximum benchmark. 
144 Ibid at p 31. 
145 A commentator on the Commission’s review of the law of insolvency stated that a super-
preference for employee claims cannot be supported since such claims can potentially reach a 
magnitude where it will simply wipe out the secured assets, which would work against the entire 
credit supply scheme and have a devastating effect on the economy: see Report on the review of the 
law of insolvency, op cit n 76, at para 80.19. 
146 Ibid. at p 31, fn 7, which refers to Derrida, ‘Le “super-privilège” des salaries dans les procedures 




   
In 1984 the Commission recommended that employee claims for salary and 
commission for a period of three months immediately before sequestration, leave pay 
for a period of 21 days and bonus be considered a preferent unsecured claim, ie paid 
in preference to other unsecured creditors but not secured claims.147 This 
recommendation was substantially implemented by the legislature through the 
insertion of section 98A in the Insolvency Act in 1998.
148
 
Finally, it is clear that the ranking of priority in terms of section 135(3) survives 
the conversion of business rescue proceedings into subsequent liquidation 
proceedings
149
  except to the extent of any claims arising out of the costs of 
liquidation.150  
It is worth noting that, under judicial management, the pre-commencement 
creditors had the discretion, at a meeting convened by the judicial manager, to 
consent to any post-commencement liabilities incurred by the judicial manager 
enjoying a preference in the order in which they were incurred over all unsecured 
claims against the company, except claims arising out of the costs of judicial 
management.151 Where the creditors consented to such preference in favour of post-
commencement claims, that preference survived the conversion of judicial 




                                                            
147 Commission’s report on the review of the law of insolvency, op cit n 75, at paragraph 80.1. At the 
time – 1984 – this was also limited to a maximum of R3 000 per employee, which adjusted for 
inflation is the equivalent of approximately R40 000 today. 
148 Section 98A was inserted by section 2 of the Judicial Matters Second Amendment Act 122 of 
1998.  
149 Section 135(4). 
150 These would refer specifically to costs of realisation outlined in section 89 of the Insolvency Act. 
151 Section 435(1)(a) of the 1973 Companies Act. 
152 Ibid s 435(1)(b). 
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5. Comparative law review on priority of post-commencement finance 
Professor Michael Katz – who had been involved in discussions around the 
reform of business rescue since at least 1998 – described the 2008 Companies Act as 
follows:  
‘For the first time in South Africa companies’ legislation we have not been 
rooted to English company law. In fact the New Companies Act is not anchored in 
the Company law of any foreign jurisdiction. The New Companies Act represents the 
best of breed, borrowing in each particular concept from the best in the particular 
jurisdiction. In certain respects we have home-grown innovations. All of this 




That being said, as has been pointed out earlier, the DTI policy document 
published in 2004154 indicated that, as far as business rescue was concerned, ‘[i]n 
particular, the provisions of the US Chapter 11 will be considered.’ The international 
reference team involved in the drafting of the 2008 Companies Act included experts 
from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia; it would appear logical 
that the applicable corporate insolvency law regimes from those jurisdictions, and in 
particular the United States, heavily influenced the development of the provisions 
relating to business rescue in South Africa. The Supreme Court of Appeal in a very 
recent judgment confirmed that our business rescue regime is adapted from similar 
concepts in foreign jurisdictions such as the United States and United Kingdom.
155
  
It would also appear logical that best-practice recommendations by international 
bodies such as the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) and the World Bank would have played at least some role during the 
process of policy formulation and drafting of provisions by participants in South 
Africa’s company law reform process. After all, ‘[m]aking company law compatible 
                                                            
153 Katz The Corporate Report Volume 1 Issue 2 August 2011 at p 6, as quoted in Oakdene Square 
Properties at para 9. 
154 Op cit n 90. 
155 Maya JA in Richter v Absa Bank Limited [2015] ZASCA 100 at para 13. 
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and harmonious with best practice jurisdictions internationally’ was one of the 
identified objectives of the company law reform process.156 
5.1 The United States 
Bankruptcy in the United States is regulated by the Bankruptcy Code157 which 
allows for two corporate insolvency procedures, namely liquidation (which is 
governed by Chapter 7) and reorganization (which is governed by Chapter 11).
158
 
Under Chapter 7 liquidation, the business ceases trading, all assets are sold and 
proceeds distributed to creditors. Chapter 11 allows any business159 to file a 
petition
160
 for protection against creditors and continue carrying on trading activities 
as a going concern while reorganizing or restructuring the business. In the majority 
of cases the corporation remains in possession of property upon which creditors have 
liens or similar security interests during this process, and becomes known as a debtor 
in possession.161 The debtor in possession effectively becomes the trustee162 and is 
empowered to operate the debtor’s business.163 A key feature of Chapter 11 
proceedings is the proposal and confirmation of a plan of reorganization; the debtor 
in possession has a period of exclusivity to file a plan, after which ‘parties in 
                                                            
156 See n 114 above. 
157 Title 11 of the United States Code. 
158 Chapter 11 was introduced by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. 
159 The procedure is open to corporations, partnerships, sole proprietorships and even individuals 
(although rare, since Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code provides a reorganization process for most 
private individuals). 
160 It should be noted that original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases arising under the 
Bankruptcy Code is held by specialist United States bankruptcy courts, which are created under 
Article I of the United States Constitution and function as units of the United States district courts. 
161 11 U.S.C. § 1101 defines ‘debtor in possession’ to mean the debtor unless a separate trustee has 
been appointed for cause. 
162 11 U.S.C. § 1107. 
163 11 U.S.C. § 1108. 
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interest’164 may file a plan.165 A plan needs to be approved by a court and all 
creditors to become binding; if at least one class of creditors does not agree with the 
plan, there is the possibility of having the plan ‘crammed down’, that is, involuntarily 
imposed on the dissenting creditors.166 
Chapter 11 features an automatic stay167 which prevents creditors from carrying 
out debt collection procedures against the debtor in possession. So-called executory 
contracts168 may either be affirmed or rejected by the debtor in possession, but such 
affirmation or rejection is subject to court approval.169 
The Bankruptcy Code distinguishes between situations where creditors are over-
secured – that is, the value of the collateral held as security exceeds the amount of 
the claim – and under-secured – that is, the value of the collateral held as security is 
lower than the amount of the claim.
170
 A debtor may bifurcate an under-secured 
claim into two components – secured to the extent of the value of the collateral and 
unsecured in respect of any remaining balance.171 To the extent that a creditor is 
over-secured, such secured creditor is entitled to interest on such claim, along with 
any reasonable fees, costs, or charges.172 The trustee may recover from property 
securing a claim all reasonable, necessary costs and expenses of preserving, or 
                                                            
164 Being the debtor, the trustee, a creditor’s committee, an equity security holders’ committee, a 
creditor, an equity security holder, or any indentured trustee. 
165 11 U.S.C. § 1121. The debtor in possession has a period of 120 days’ exclusivity to file a plan. 
166 11 U.S.C. § 1126. 
167 11 U.S.C. § 362. 
168 Contracts which at the time of filing the petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy have not yet been fully 
executed, in that both parties still have obligations to perform. 
169 11 U.S.C. § 365. 
170 11 U.S.C. § 506. 
171 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). 
172 11 U.S.C. § 506(b). 
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disposing of, such property to the extent of any benefit to the holder of such claim.173 
Furthermore, a secured creditor in Chapter 11 has a right to the value of her claim, 
and not necessarily the right to receive the collateral itself.174 
All forms of bankruptcy in the United States – including Chapter 7 liquidation – 
follow the same ranking of priorities, which is set out in Chapter 5. When property is 
sold that is subject to a lien or security interest, the proceeds are paid to that secured 
creditor after all necessary costs and expenses of preserving and disposing of the 
property have been paid. To the extent that there is a balance remaining after the 
secured creditor’s claim has been settled, that balance is used to settle, on a pro rata 
basis, various categories of unsecured creditors in terms of a scheme of priority that 
is primarily set out in § 507.175  
                                                            
173 11 U.S.C. § 506(c). 
174 In Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co. 311 U.S. 273, 278 (1940) the Supreme Court 
unequivocally held that a secured creditor has a constitutionally protected right up to the value of the 
mortgaged property; however, ‘[t]here is no constitutional claim of the creditor to more than that.’ 
175 § 507(a) identifies and ranks ten categories or rungs of priority unsecured claims, as follows: 
 
First, certain claims due to domestic and child support obligations (which are mostly irrelevant in 
Chapter 11 cases); 
Second, administrative expenses incurred during the bankruptcy, which includes the costs of 
professionals, employee salaries and wages, as well as litigation expenses during the Chapter 11 
proceedings; 
Third, certain costs incurred in involuntary bankruptcy cases in the ordinary course of business after 
the commencement of the case but before the earlier of the appointment of a trustee and the order for 
relief; 
Fourth, employee claims, subject to a maximum of $10,000, for salary, commissions and other 
benefits earned within 180 days immediately preceding the bankruptcy; 
Fifth, claims for contributions to an employee benefit plan, subject to a cap, incurred within the 180 
days immediately preceding the bankruptcy; 
Sixth, certain claims of grain farmers and fishermen; 
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This so-called ladder of priorities means that each level – or rung – of priority 
must be settled in full before the next lowest rung of priority may be repaid. 
Despite the strong protection provided to secured creditors under Chapter 11, it 
should be noted that secured creditors may lose their preference over unsecured 
creditors in certain circumstances. These include a situation where a court confirms a 
plan of reorganization that varies the default distribution rules, as well as where a 
judge may, in appropriate cases, ‘subordinate’ one claim to another.176 
The debtor in possession may obtain unsecured credit and incur unsecured debt 
in the ordinary course of business to pay for allowable administrative expenses,
177
 
which means that such debtor in possession finance will enjoy priority over virtually 
all other unsecured claims against the debtor.  A debtor in possession may also 
approach the court to authorize obtaining unsecured credit or to incur unsecured debt 
for any other purpose outside the ordinary course of business, which will then have 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Seventh, deposits made pre-petition by individuals, subject to a maximum of $1,800 per individual, in 
respect of leases or purchases for personal, family or household use; 
Eighth, certain unsecured tax claims by governmental units; 
Ninth, certain unsecured claims related to commitments for capital maintenance owed to a Federal 
depository institutions regulatory agency; 
Tenth, tort claims for death or personal injuries resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle or 
vessel by the debtor while intoxicated. 
 
Only after all of these priority claims have been paid will general unsecured creditors be paid on a pro 
rata basis. 
176 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) provides that a court may, after notice and a hearing, under principles of 
equitable subordination, subordinate for purposes of distribution all or part of an allowed claim to all 
or part of another allowed claim or all or part of an allowed interest to all or part of another allowed 
interest; or order than any lien securing such a subordinated claim be transferred to the estate. 
177 11 U.S.C. § 364. The allowable administrative expenses are listed under § 503(b)(1) and includes 
the actual and necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate including wages, salaries, and 
commissions for services rendered after commencement of the bankruptcy, as well as certain taxes. 
38 
 
   
the same priority as an allowed administrative expense.178 If the debtor in possession 
is unable to obtain unsecured credit to pay for allowable administrative expenses, the 
court may authorize the debtor in possession to obtain finance by allowing the 
security of a lien on property that is not yet encumbered, or otherwise allowing a 
further lien on property that is already encumbered.179 
The court may even authorize the debtor in possession to obtain finance on the 
basis of a lien that is senior, ie ranks first, to existing liens on a property.180 This is a 
so-called ‘priming lien’, but may only be authorised by a court if it is satisfied that 
(a) the debtor in possession is unable to obtain such finance otherwise; and (b) that 
there is adequate protection of the interest of the existing secured creditor whose lien 
is being primed. The burden of proof on the issue of adequate protection of the 
existing mortgagee is on the debtor in possession. 
It is clear that a priming lien is the most aggressive approach allowed in the 
Bankruptcy Code to provide liquidity to a debtor in possession, and that only a small 
number of cases would satisfy both conditions to allow the court to authorize it. One 
of the most notable US cases dealing with priming liens for debtor in possession 
finance was the case of In re Olde Prairie Block Owner.181 In this case Judge 
Schmetterer indicated that ‘adequate protection’ requires that a secured lender 
receives compensation or something of value during the duration of the bankruptcy 
proceedings to protect it against any erosion in value as a result of depreciation, 
dissipation or any other cause, including the actual value of the priming debtor in 
possession loan. Adequate protection, it was stated, can take many forms, including 
for example periodic cash payments, replacement liens, liens on unencumbered 
property, or an ‘equity cushion’, that is, the amount by which a secured lender is 
over-secured. However, in Olde Prairie Block it was pointed out that a large equity 
cushion is not a ‘debtor’s piggy bank and the uses contemplated for the new loan 
                                                            
178 11 U.S.C. § 364(b). 
179 11 U.S.C. § 364(c). 
180 11 U.S.C. § 364(d). 
181 In re Olde Prairie Block Owner, LLC, 448 B.R. 482 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011). 
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must have serious likelihood of benefitting the property and advancing the purposes 
of reorganization. A priming lien without such a showing would impose an 
unwarranted burden on the secured creditor if reorganization fails.’ Also, ‘allowing a 
priming lien should be considered with caution to avoid transferring the 
entrepreneurial risk of failure by Debtor’s investors and principals onto the secured 
creditor.’ 
It has been held in a number of cases that an under-secured creditor may have her 
lien primed in certain circumstances where she can be provided with adequate 
protection by a debtor in possession by preserving and maximizing the value of the 
collateral during the Chapter 11 proceedings.182 
It is clear that there is considerable protection of secured creditors’ interests 
under US bankruptcy law. Secured claims are generally paid in priority to unsecured 
claims, and even where a debtor in possession successfully applies to court for 
authorization to allow a new funder to leap-frog an existing secured creditor’s 
priority to the proceeds of specific collateral, the interest of that existing mortgagee 
is still protected by requiring the debtor in possession to prove that there is adequate 
protection for such existing mortgagee. 
5.2 England and Wales 
Corporate insolvency proceedings in England and Wales is regulated by the 
Insolvency Act 1986, as modified by the Enterprise Act 2002.  
                                                            
182 In re Hubbard Power & Light, 202 B.R. 680 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1996) (where it was held that the 
secured creditor was adequately protected since the first priority priming lien would allow the debtor 
to resume operations, which would allow its assets to increase in value); In re 495 Cent. Park Ave. 
Corp., 136 B.R. 626 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that an existing mortgagee was adequately 
protected since the value of the debtor’s property would increase as a result of renovations funded by 
the first priority priming loan); In re Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC., No. 08-61570, 2008 WL 
5875547 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2008) (where it was held that the debtor in possession loan would preserve 
the value of the secured creditors’ collateral and in fact enhance it to an extent greater than the amount 
of the proposed priming loan). 
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English corporate insolvency law provides for a procedure called 
administration.183 There are three ways a company can be placed into administration. 
The first is through an out-of-court appointment by the holder of a floating charge 
over the whole or substantially the whole of the company’s property.184 A floating 
charge is a rather unique English security interest that is a charge over a class of 
assets present and future, where the class changes from time to time, and where the 
party in whose favour the floating charge operates is only able to attach the assets in 
that class at a specific time – called the ‘crystallisation’ - at which time the charge 
becomes a fixed charge. While the charge is floating, the debtor is able to freely 
utilise the assets falling within that class and may carry on its business in the 
ordinary way.185 
The second way a company can enter administration is if the company itself 
makes an out-of-court appointment of an administrator on giving prior notice to a 
qualified floating charge holder.186 A third way is for an administrator to be 
appointed by the court on application by the company itself, the directors of the 
company, one or more creditors, or the designated officer of a magistrate’s court, or a 
combination of these.187 The court may only make the order if it is satisfied that the 
company is or is likely to become unable to pay its debts, and that the administration 
order is reasonably likely to achieve the purposes of administration. The purposes of 
administration include either rescuing the company as a going concern, or achieving 
a better result for the company’s creditors as a whole than would be likely if the 
company were wound up, or realizing property in order to make a distribution to one 
                                                            
183 The English law also provides for two other insolvency reorganization procedures – ‘company 
voluntary arrangement’ as well as schemes of arrangement under the Companies Act, which are both 
effectively privately-negotiated agreements between the company and its creditors concern 
rescheduling of debt, payment holidays etc 
184 Schedule B1 Insolvency Act 1986 para 14.  
185 Re Yorkshire Woolcombers Association [1903] 2 Ch 284. 
186 Schedule B1 Insolvency Act 1986 paras 22 and 26. 
187 Ibid, para 12. 
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or more secured or preferential creditors.188 An administrator is an officer of the 
court, whether or not she is appointed by the court.189 
The effect of a company going into administration is a moratorium on insolvency 
proceedings190 and on other legal processes, including steps taken to enforce security 
over the company’s property.191 Proceedings to enforce security over the company’s 
property may only be taken with the consent of the administrator or with the 
permission of the court.  
The administrator is vested with very broad powers to run the debtor’s business, 
and may do anything necessary or expedient for the management of the affairs, 
business and property of the company.192 Once appointed, the administrator must 
require one or more relevant persons to provide her with a statement of the affairs of 
the company.
193
 The administrator must then prepare a statement of proposals for 
achieving the purpose of administration, which is presented to an initial creditors’ 
meeting for approval.194 
An administrator’s statement of proposals may not include any action which 
affects the right of a secured creditor of the company to enforce her security, would 
result in a preferential debt of the company being paid otherwise than in priority to 
its non-preferential debts, or would result in one preferential creditor of the company 
being paid a smaller proportion of his debt than another, unless the creditor in 
question consents thereto.195 Where property is subject to a security other than a 
                                                            
188 Ibid, para 3. 
189 Ibid, para 5. 
190 Ibid, para 42. 
191 Ibid, para 43. 
192 Ibid, para 59. 
193 Ibid, para 47. 
194 Ibid, paras 49 and 51. 
195 Ibid, para 73. 
42 
 
   
floating charge, the administrator may apply to court for permission to dispose of 
property subject to such security as if it were not subject to the security, provided 
that the disposal of the property would be likely to promote the purpose of 
administration in respect of the company. Furthermore, upon such disposal the debt 
secured by that property must be settled with the net proceeds.196 
The administrator of a company has the power to raise or borrow money and 
grant security therefor over the property of the company.197 It is therefore clear that 
an administrator may raise post-commencement finance, and may do so by providing 
security to potential post-commencement finance providers. However, the 
administrator is not able to provide priority to a post-commencement finance 
provider, unless the consent of the existing secured creditor is obtained.198  
McCormack
199
 indicates that during parliamentary debates on the reform of 
corporate insolvency reform in the United Kingdom, the government resisted 
providing super-priority status to post-commencement finance providers after the 
administration process had commenced, since it was afraid it would encourage the 
funding of rescue proposals irrespective of the commercial viability thereof since 
lenders would be guaranteed a return. McCormack also argues that the Insolvency 
Act could be read in a way so as to permit new financing arrangements during 
administration to take priority over an existing floating charge (but not over existing 
fixed charges or other security).200  
                                                            
196 Ibid, para 71. 
197 Schedule 1 of the Insolvency Act 1986, item 3. 
198 That is, the secured creditor consents to a subordination agreement whereby first lien status is 
granted to the post-commencement funder who would otherwise be secondary to that secured creditor.  
199 McCormack Corporate Rescue Law – An Anglo-American Perspective (2008) at 176. 
200 Ibid at 207. 
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5.3 Australia 
Chapter 5 of the Corporations Act 2001 provides for ‘voluntary 
administration’.201 The object of voluntary administration is to maximize the chances 
of the company – or as much of its business – continuing in existence; or, if it is not 
possible for the company or its business to continue in existence, results in a better 
return for the company’s creditors and members than would result from an 
immediate liquidation of the company.202 
An administrator may be appointed in a number of ways if it is believed that the 
company either is or will become insolvent: either by the company itself,
203
 by a 
liquidator,204 or by a secured creditor of the company having security over the whole, 
or substantially the whole, of a company’s property.205 No authorization by the court 
is required. 
The company’s property is protected against creditors during administration by, 
amongst others, an automatic stay of proceedings.206  
An administrator, once appointed, is given extremely wide powers – she may 
perform any function and exercise any power that the company or any of its officers 
could perform or exercise if the company were not under administration.207 While a 
company is under administration, the management stays in place but is only able to 
                                                            
201 See Corporations Act 2001, Part 5.3A, which consists of sections 435 to 451. 
202 § 435A Corporations Act 2001. It will be noted that these objectives are virtually identical to the 
goals of business rescue as defined in section 128(1)(b)(iii) of the Companies Act 2008. 
203 § 436A Corporations Act 2001. 
204 § 436B Corporations Act 2001. 
205 § 436C Corporations Act 2001. 
206 § 440D Corporations Act 2001. The automatic stay can only be circumvented by either obtaining 
written consent from the administrator, or with the leave of the court. 
207 § 437A Corporations Act 2001. 
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perform or exercise a function or power with the administrator’s written approval.208 
Only the administrator is able to deal with the company’s property while the 
company is under administration.209 
The first order of affairs for an administrator is to investigate the company’s 
affairs and to consider possible courses of action.210 The administrator acts in the 
creditors’ interests and must decide on either executing a deed of company 
arrangement (essentially a restructure plan to be presented to creditors), or taking the 
company out of administration, or having it liquidated. The administrator then 
convenes a meeting of creditors at which the company’s future is decided upon.
211
  
Where property of a company in administration which is subject to a security 




1. If the net proceeds of sale equals or falls short of the debt secured by the 
security interest, the secured creditor is entitled to retain the full net proceeds. 
2. If the net proceeds of sale exceeds the debt secured by the security interest, 
the secured party must pay the excess proceeds to the administrator of the 
company. 
There is no mention of post-commencement finance under Chapter 5, but due to 
the extremely wide powers given to an administrator, it is clear that she can raise 
finance after being appointed. However, the Australian statute makes no provision 
for any form of priority in favour of post-commencement finance. 
 
                                                            
208 § 437C Corporations Act 2001. 
209 § 437D Corporations Act 2001. 
210 § 438A Corporations Act 2001.  
211 § 439A Corporations Act 2001. 
212 § 441EA Corporations Act 2001. 
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5.4 The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law 
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) is a 
subsidiary body of the United Nations General Assembly, and prepares international 
legislative texts for use by member States in modernising commercial law and non-
legislative texts for use by commercial parties in negotiating transactions.213  
In 1999 a proposal was made by UNCITRAL to undertake a project to provide a 
legislative guide on insolvency law, specifically corporate insolvency, which 
culminated in the adoption of a legislative guide on insolvency law in June 2004.214 
The purpose of the UNCITRAL legislative guide is to ‘assist the establishment of 
an efficient and effective legal framework to address the financial difficulty of 
debtors. It is intended to be used as a reference by national authorities and legislative 
bodies when preparing new laws or regulations or reviewing the adequacy of existing 
laws and regulations. The advice provided in the Guide aims at achieving a balance 
between the need to address the debtor’s financial difficulty as quickly and 
efficiently as possible and the interests of the various parties directly concerned with 
that financial difficulty, principally creditors and other parties with a stake in the 
debtor’s business, as well as with public policy concerns.’215 
One of the key objectives of an effective and efficient insolvency law identified 
by the Guide includes the recognition of existing creditor rights and establishment of 
clear rules for the ranking of priority claims.216 The Guide recommends that priorities 
should be based upon commercial bargains and not reflect social and political 
concerns that have the potential to distort the outcome of insolvency; instead, 
priorities that are not based on commercial bargains need to be minimized. 
                                                            
213 South Africa was elected as a member of UNCITRAL at the fifty-eighth session of the United 
Nations’ General Assembly in 2003, with a membership term eventually running from 2004 to 2013. 
214 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (2004) (‘the Guide’) at iii. 
215 Ibid at para 1. 
216 The Guide at 13. 
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The Guide recognises the need for post-commencement finance, and identifies 
the purpose of provisions on post-commencement finance to: 
(a) Facilitate finance to be obtained for the continued operation or survival of the 
business of the debtor or the preservation or enhancement of the value of the 
assets of the estate; 
(b) Ensure appropriate protection for the providers of post-commencement 
finance; and 
(c) Ensure appropriate protection for those parties whose rights may be affected 
by the provisions of post-commencement finance.
217
 
The Guide recommends that the law should establish a priority for post-
commencement finance that should at least ensure repayment of post-commencement 
finance ahead of ordinary pre-commencement unsecured creditors.
218
 Furthermore, 
the law should enable post-commencement finance providers to obtain security for 
repayment of their claims, including security on any unencumbered assets of the 
company, including assets acquired post-commencement, or junior or lower-priority 
security on already-encumbered assets of the company.219 Furthermore, the law 
should specify that a security interest over the assets of the company to secure post-
commencement finance does not have priority ahead of existing, pre-commencement 
security interest over the same assets unless the consent of the existing secured 
creditor(s) thereto is obtained.220 However, where the existing secured creditor does 
not consent, the court may authorize the post-commencement finance provider 
having a higher priority than the existing secured creditor, provided very specific 
conditions are satisfied, including: 
1. Allowing the existing secured creditor the opportunity to make 
representations to the court; 
                                                            
217 The Guide at 118. 
218 The Guide, Recommendation 64 at 119. 
219 The Guide, Recommendation 65 at 119. 
220 The Guide, Recommendation 66 at 119. 
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2. The debtor company proving that it cannot obtain finance in any other way; 
and 
3. The interests of the existing secured creditor being protected.221 
Furthermore, it is recommended that where reorganization proceedings are 
subsequently converted to liquidation, any priority accorded to post-commencement 
finance during the reorganization proceedings should survive such conversion and 
continue to be applied in the liquidation.222  
5.5 The World Bank Principles 
The World Bank originally developed the Principles for Effective Insolvency and 
Creditor Rights Systems (the ‘Principles’) in 2001. The Principles are ‘a distillation 




The Principles recommend, amongst others, that the priority of secured creditors 
in their collateral should be upheld and, absent the secured creditor’s consent, its 
interest in the collateral should not be subordinated to other priorities granted in the 
course of the insolvency proceedings, and distributions to secured creditors should be 
made as promptly as possible.224 After distributions to secured creditors from their 
collateral and the payment of claims related to administrative expenses, proceeds 
available for distribution should be distributed pari passu to the remaining body of 
unsecured creditors, unless there are compelling reasons to justify giving priority 
status to a particular class of claims;225 however, employees are a vital part of an 
                                                            
221 The Guide, Recommendation 67 at 119. Effectively, this recommendation is to adopt substantially 
the same procedure as the priming lien under US law. 
222 The Guide, Recommendation 68 at 119. 
223 World Bank Principles for Effective Creditor/Debtor Regimes (2011) (‘the Principles’) at 1. 
224 The Principles, C12.2, at 19. 
225 The Principles, C12.3, at 19. 
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enterprise, and careful consideration should be given to balancing the rights of 
employees with other creditors.226 
5.6 Observations 
It is clear that the corporate insolvency regimes in the jurisdictions referred to 
have very strong protections in favour of pre-commencement secured creditors. 
There are of course specific instances where a secured creditor may see her real 
security being eroded in favour of a post-commencement finance provider, but such 
cases are the exception and require judicial adjudication to become effective, along 
with proof from the debtor that the existing secured creditor being prejudiced will be 
adequately protected in some way or manner.  
6. Distribution rules in South African insolvency 
As confirmed in SARS v Beginsel,
227
 the categorization of creditors into secured 
and unsecured creditors is uncontroversial and accepted in our law. In order to be a 
secured creditor, a creditor must hold security228 over property of the debtor at the 
time that the debtor is sequestrated or liquidated. In the vast majority of cases 
security is provided in the form of a mortgage bond that hypothecates immovable 
property. Secured creditors’ claims are generally paid out of the proceeds from the 
realisation of the assets that they hold as security.  
Insolvency is a collective debt enforcement process, and once a debtor is 
sequestrated or liquidated a concursus creditorum arises that effectively freezes the 
rights of creditors as at the date of liquidation. As Innes CJ put it over a century ago: 
‘[T]he hand of the law is laid upon the estate, and at once the rights of the 
general body of creditors have to be taken into consideration. No transaction can 
thereafter be entered into with regard to estate matters by a single creditor to the 
                                                            
226 The Principles, C12.4, at 19. 
227 Op cit n 130. 
228 As defined in section 2 sv Insolvency Act 1936, ‘in relation to the claim of a creditor of an 
insolvent estate, means property of that estate over which the creditor has a preferent right by virtue of 
any special mortgage, landlord’s legal hypothec, pledge or right of retention’. 
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prejudice of the general body. The claim of each creditor must be dealt with as it 
existed at the issue of the order.’
229
 
It should be noted that in South African law individuals and trusts are 
sequestrated by order of court and a trustee is appointed to manage the insolvent’s 
affairs. In the case of a company or close corporation, the insolvent is liquidated and 
a liquidator (or liquidators) appointed to manage the insolvent’s affairs and wind up 
the corporate entity. 
Unsecured creditors, being creditors that do not hold security over property of the 
debtor at the time that the debtor is sequestrated or liquidated, are generally divided 
in South African insolvency law into preferent creditors and concurrent creditors. 
Preferent230 creditors are preferred by virtue of specific statutory provisions that 
elevate their claims in priority above those of general concurrent creditors. It should 
be noted that the Commission indicated in its report on the review of the law of 
insolvency231 that such provisions preferring creditors ‘are undesirable and cannot be 
justified merely because revenue is utilised for the benefit of the public or because 
the State or State assisted bodies are involved.’232 Indeed, there has long been an 
argument that statutory preferences in favour of certain unsecured creditors should be 
removed on the basis that all unsecured creditors should be treated equally and 
fairly.233 However, there have also been opinions raised that certain unsecured 
creditors, for example involuntary unsecured creditors such as victims of delict, 
should have some form of stake in real security.234 
                                                            
229 Walker v Syfret NO 1911 AD 141 at 166. 
230 Preferent is defined in section 2 sv Insolvency Act 1936, ‘in relation to any claim against an 
insolvent estate, means the right to payment of that claim out of the assets of the estate in preference 
to other claims.’ 
231 Op cit n 76. 
232 Ibid at para 7.3. 
233 Du Plessis ‘Voorgestelde hersiening van voorkeureise by insolvensie’ 1985 De Jure 161. 
234 For a full analysis of the policy grounds for and against such a suggestion, see Boraine and van 
Wyk ‘Reconsidering the plight of the five foolish maidens: Should the unsecured creditor stake a 
claim in real security?’ Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 2011 347-371. 
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When an asset of a sequestrated or liquidated debtor is realized, the costs of the 
maintenance and realisation of that asset is paid out of the proceeds of that asset as a 
first priority.235 If that asset serves as security for secured creditors’ claims, the 
proceeds are then paid out to those secured creditors’ in the order of the ranking of 
their preference (ie a first bondholder will be paid in full before a second bondholder 
is paid). Should a situation arise where the proceeds from the sale of the asset are 
sufficient to cover the realisation costs as well as settle all claims secured by that 
asset, the balance remaining is termed the ‘free residue’.236 If on the other hand all 
secured claims are not paid or are only settled in part, such secured creditors will 
have to claim the shortfall as concurrent creditors of the sequestrated estate and hope 
that free residue is achieved on other assets.237 
The free residue is first applied to pay certain specified priority creditors. The 
scheme of priority in terms of which the free residue is to be applied per the 
Insolvency Act may be summarized as follows: 
Firstly, certain funeral and death-bed expenses;
238
  
Second, the costs of the sequestration or liquidation of the estate in question, with 
the exception of the costs of realisation of assets;239  
Third, certain costs of execution, such as the taxed fees of the sheriff, incurred for 
legal proceedings before sequestration or liquidation;240 
                                                            
235 Section 89 of the Insolvency Act. 
236 Defined in Section 2 sv Insolvency Act: ‘in relation to an insolvent estate, means that portion of the 
estate which is not subject to any right of preference by reason of any special mortgage, legal 
hypothec, pledge or right of retention.’ 
237 Refer to sections 89, 95 and 103(2) of the Insolvency Act. 
238 Section 96 of the Insolvency Act. 
239 Section 97 of the Insolvency Act. 
240 Section 98 of the Insolvency Act. 
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Fourth, unpaid salaries or wages or related claims of former employees of the 
insolvent, for a period not exceeding three months, as well as any severance or 
retrenchment pay due to the employee;241 
Fifth, certain unpaid statutory obligations of an insolvent, including amounts due 
in respect of workmen’s compensation, sales tax, value-added tax and unemployment 
insurance contributions, which claims shall rank pari passu and abate in equal 
proportion, if necessary;242 




Seventh, claims proved against the estate which were secured by a general 
mortgage bond, in their order of preference;244 
Eighth, non-preference claims, that is, concurrent creditors who are repaid pari 
passu, that is, in proportion to the amount of each such claim; if all such claims have 
been paid in full, then interest on such claims from the date of sequestration to the 
date of payment may be paid on a pari passu basis.
245
 
It is trite that in South African insolvency law a secured creditor is repaid first 
from the proceeds of security on which that secured creditor relies, but that such a 
security is also subject to the costs of realizing it. However, the security may also be 
subject to a number of other charges in favour of unsecured creditors, which have the 
effect of ‘carving out’ the secured creditor’s interest. Examples of such charges, 
which are usually mandated by legislation, will be discussed below. 
 
                                                            
241 Section 98A of the Insolvency Act. 
242 Section 99 of the Insolvency Act. 
243 Section 101 of the Insolvency Act. 
244 Section 102 of the Insolvency Act. 
245 Section 103 of the Insolvency Act. 
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7. Statutory provisions that limit or ‘carve out’ real security 
A number of examples of instances where statutory provisions have the effect of 
‘carving out’ a secured creditor’s claim and preferring certain unsecured creditors 
over secured creditors (as well as over other unsecured creditors in general) will be 
discussed below.  
Numerous statutory provisions exist that confer a preference over certain 
unsecured creditors vis-à-vis all other unsecured creditors, but for the purposes of the 
current discussion the scope will be limited to instances where preference is already 
conferred on specified unsecured creditors in favour of secured creditors.
246
  
7.1 Municipal debt 
Section 118(1) of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act247 provides as 
follows: 
‘A registrar of deeds may not register the transfer of property except on 
production to that registrar of deeds of a prescribed certificate –  
(a) Issued by the municipality or municipalities in which that property is 
situated; and 
(b) Which certifies that all amounts that became due in connection with the 
property for municipal service fees, surcharges on fees, property rates and 
other municipal taxes, levies and duties during the two years preceding the 
date of application for the certificate have been fully paid.’ 
Such a provision is referred to as an ‘embargo’ or ‘veto’ provision. The first 
judgment to deal with a similar provision248 in our law occurred over a century ago – 
Innes CJ stated as follows in the case of Cohen’s Trustees:249  
                                                            
246 Instances where such unsecured creditors become what is generally termed a ‘preferent unsecured 
creditor’, that is, in preference to unsecured creditors in general, are listed in sections 96, 98, 99 and 
101 of the Insolvency Act. 
247 Act 32 of 2000, hereafter ‘Municipal Systems Act’. 
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‘Now reading that section in connection with the other provisions of the statute, 
the intention seems to have been to give the local authority a right to veto the 
transfer of property until its claims in respect of rates should be satisfied. The result, 
of course, was to create, in effect, a very real and extensive preference over the 
proceeds of rateable property realized in insolvency; and to compel payment of the 
burden thus imposed before a sale of property could be carried through even in 
cases where insolvency had not supervened. The hold over the property thus given to 
the local authority is entirely the creation of statute; its object was to ensure payment 
of the liabilities due by ratepayers as such, and one would therefore think it was 
intended to continue until all liabilities arising out of rates had been discharged; in 
other words, that the account of the municipality against the property should be 
closed when transfer passed, and that transfer should not pass until it was closed.’ 
Similar provisions were to follow in Transvaal legislation
250
 until the 
promulgation of the Municipal Systems Act, which introduced the above-mentioned 
s 118(1), which has a time limit of two years prior to transfer. The embargo section 
survived a constitutional challenge,
251
 but it was later confirmed that this embargo 
provision is solely limited to municipal debts incurred two years prior to the 
application for a municipal clearance certificate, and that the provision does not 
allow municipalities to withhold clearance certificates in respect of debt incurred 
prior to this two-year period.252 
While the embargo provision gives a municipality a right to veto the transfer of a 
property until relevant debt is settled, they do not have the effect of rendering the 
municipality’s claim preferent to existing mortgages in the case of a sale of 
execution.253 In other words, the nature of such a provision is that it gives the right to 
                                                                                                                                                                            
248 The provision in question being section 26 of the Local Authorities Rating Ordinance of 1903 
(Transvaal), which contained an embargo provision that was unfettered by a time limit. 
249 Johannesburg Municipality v Cohen’s Trustees 1909 TS 811, at 817. 
250 Section 47 of the Local Government Ordinance 11 of 1926, followed by Section 50(1) of the Local 
Government Ordinance 17 of 1939 (both of which had time limits of three years prior to transfer). 
251 Mkontwana op cit n 35. 
252 Per Nugent JA in City of Cape Town v Real People Housing Ltd 2010 (5) SA 196 (SCA). 
253 Rabie NO v Rand Townships Registrar 1926 TPD 286 (‘Rabie’); see also Nel NO v Body 
Corporate of the Seaways Building and Another 1996 (1) SA 131 (A) at 134B-135C; Firstrand Bank 
Ltd v Body Corporate of Geovy Villa 2004 (3) SA 362 (SCA) at 369F-370E. 
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resist any transfer unless the claim is paid, but it does not provide the right to have 
the property which is subject to the claim sold and be paid first out of the proceeds, 
nor does it provide the right, if the property is sold in execution by another creditor, 
to be paid first out of the proceeds.254 In response to judicial findings to this extent, 
the Transvaal legislature introduced a provision which read as follows:  
‘All such charges and sums mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection 
(1) shall be a charge upon the premises or interest in land in respect of which they 
are owing and shall be preferent to any mortgage bond passed over such property 
subsequent to the coming into operation of this Ordinance.’
255
  
The above ‘charge’ was described as amounting to a tacit statutory hypothec,256 
which effectively secures the municipal debt in preference to any other mortgage 
bond over the property in question. The current provision creating such a security in 
favour of the municipality is s 118(3) of the Municipal Systems Act, which reads as 
follows: 
‘An amount due for municipal service fees, surcharges on fees, property rates 
and other municipal taxes, levies and duties is a charge upon the property in 
connection with which the amount is owing and enjoys preference over any mortgage 
bond registered against the property.’ 
There is no time limit in the wording of the above provision – the unlimited 
nature of this preference in favour of a municipality provided by s 118(3) has been 
confirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal.257 However, the preference is only 
unlimited outside of insolvency due to the operation of s 118(2) of the Municipal 
Systems Act, which states: 
                                                            
254 Rabie case at 292. 
255 Section 50(2) of the Local Government Ordinance 17 of 1939. 
256 See Stadsraad, Pretoria v Letabakop Farming Operations (Pty) Ltd 1981 (4) SA 911 (T) at 918-C-
G; Firstrand Bank Ltd v Body Corporate of Geovy Villa n 143 supra at 368J-369A). 
257 BOE Bank Ltd v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality [2005] ZASCA 21. 
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‘In the case of the transfer of immovable property by a trustee of an insolvent 
estate, the provisions of this section are subject to section 89 of the Insolvency Act, 
1936 (Act No. 24 of 1936).’
258 
Section 89 of the Insolvency Act provides as follows: 
(1) The cost of maintaining, conserving and realizing any property shall be paid 
out of the proceeds of that property, if sufficient and if insufficient and that 
property is subject to a special mortgage, landlord’s legal hypothec, pledge, 
or right of retention the deficiency shall be paid by those creditors, pro rata, 
who have proved their claims and who would have been entitled, in priority 
to other persons, to payment of their claims out of those proceeds if they had 
been sufficient to cover the said cost and those claims. The trustee’s 
remuneration in respect of any such property and a proportionate share of 
the costs incurred by the trustee in giving security for his proper 
administration of the estate, calculated on the proceeds of the sale of the 
property, a proportionate share of the Master’s fees, and if the property is 
immovable, any tax as defined in subsection (5) which is or will become due 
thereon in respect of any period not exceeding two years which may be due 
on the said tax in respect of any such period, shall form part of the costs of 
realisation. 
(2) If a secured creditor (other than a secured creditor upon whose petition the 
estate in question was sequestrated) states in his affidavit submitted in 
support of his claim against the estate that he relies for the satisfaction of his 
claim solely on the proceeds of the property which constitutes his security, he 
shall not be liable for any costs of sequestration other than the costs specified 
                                                            
258 Heher JA in The City of Johannesburg v Kaplan NO and Another [2006] ZASCA 39 (‘Kaplan’) at 
para 18 explained that s 118(2) has its genesis in a proviso to an earlier embargo provision, which 
stated ‘provided that in the case of transfer of immovable property the provisions of this section shall 
be read subject to the provisions of section eighty-nine of the Insolvency Act, No. 24 of 1936, and the 
latter provisions shall apply.’ According to the learned judge, it would appear that the drafter of s 118 
chose to treat the proviso as a substantive subsection but repeated its application to the whole of the 




   
in subsection (1), and other than costs for which he may be liable under 
paragraph (a) or (b) of the proviso to section one hundred and six.259 
(3) Any interest due on a secured claim in respect of any period not exceeding 
two years immediately preceding the date of sequestration shall be likewise 
secured as if it were part of the capital sum. 
(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of any law which prohibits the transfer of any 
immovable property unless any tax as defined in subsection (5) due thereon 
has been paid, that law shall not debar the trustee of an insolvent estate from 
transferring any immovable property in that estate for the purpose of 
liquidating the estate, if he has paid the tax which may have been due on that 
property in respect of the periods mentioned in subsection (1) and no 
preference shall be accorded to any claim for such a tax in respect of any 
other period. 
(5) For the purposes of subsections (1) and (4) ‘tax’ in relation to immovable 
property means any amount payable periodically in respect of that property 
to the State or for the benefit of a provincial administration or to a body 
established by or under the authority of any law in discharge of a liability to 
make such periodical payments, if that liability is an incident of the 
ownership of that property. 
Subsection 89(4) of the 1936 Insolvency Act featured a significant addition from 
its equivalent provision under the earlier Insolvency Act,260 that addition being the 
phrase ‘and no preference shall be accorded to any claim for such a tax in respect of 
any other period.’  
It was confirmed in Kaplan261 that the reason for the addition was clear: due to a 
growing practice of creating statutory quasi-liens and statutory charges or 
preferences – which had no limit placed on its duration outside of insolvency – 
section 89(4)’s purpose was to provide certainty to creditors and trustees of the rights 
                                                            
259 Section 106 deals with contributions by creditors towards the costs of sequestration where the free 
residue is insufficient to meet those expenses. 
260 Section 88(4) of the Insolvency Act 32 of 1916. 
261 Op cit n 257, at paras 20-21. 
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and obligations attaching to the realisation of immovable property, and therefore 
operates to limit the duration of preferences which arose from statutory quasi-liens 
and charges.262 
Once a debtor has been sequestrated or liquidated, as far as municipal debts owed 
by that debtor is concerned, the preference in favour of the municipality operate as 
follows: 
1. The municipality has the benefit of the embargo clause which allows it to 
prevent transfer of immovable property by refusing a clearance certificate 
until all municipal debt owed to it by the debtor for a period of two years 
immediately preceding the date of application for the clearance certificate has 
been paid. 
2. To the extent that there is additional remaining municipal debt, the 
municipality is then provided with a preference through the security clause, 
but to the extent that any portion of that municipal debt are ‘taxes’ within the 
meaning of s 89(5), the preference in respect of such debt is limited to a 
period of two years prior to the date of sequestration or liquidation of the 
debtor. To the extent that any portion of that municipal debt does not fall 
within the meaning of ‘taxes’, s 89(4) does not operate to limit the preference 
in favour of the municipality.263 
It has been confirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal that, outside of 
insolvency, the preference provided by s 118(3) has the effect of providing 
municipalities with a lien ‘having the effect of a tacit statutory hypothec…and no 
time limit is placed on its duration outside of insolvency…so that a municipality 
                                                            
262 In Kaplan, Heher JA referred to examples listed in a South Rhodesian case, Commissioner of Taxes 
v Master and Trustee in Insolvent Estate Collias 1930 SR 12 at 16, as well as Mars (Hockly ed) The 
Law of Insolvency 3rd edition (1936) at 352-3. 
263 See Eastern Substructure of Greater Johannesburg Transitional Council v Venter NO 2001 (1) SA 
360 (SCA) at 369B-D. 
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enjoys preference over a registered mortgage bond on the proceeds of the 
property.’264 
Section 89 of the Insolvency Act does not apply to business rescue proceedings. 
Therefore, once business rescue proceedings have commenced, there is no time limit 
placed on the preference in favour of municipalities. 
7.2 Body corporate levies 
The Sectional Titles Act265 provides that the Registrar of Deeds shall not register 
a transfer of a unit unless there is produced to him a conveyancer’s certificate 
confirming that, as at date of registration, the body corporate of the sectional scheme 
in question has certified that all moneys due to the body corporate by the seller of the 
unit in question have been paid, or that adequate provision to the satisfaction of the 
body corporate for payment thereof has been made.
266
 This effectively provides a 
body corporate with an embargo provision similar to section 118(1) discussed above. 
The effect of such an embargo provision in insolvency proceedings is that a body 
corporate enjoys an effective preference
267
 in respect of unpaid pre-liquidation levies 
– proceeds from the sale of an encumbered asset will only be able to flow to the 
secured creditor concerned once the body corporate has been settled, which means 
that a body corporate effectively ranks in priority before secured creditors.
268
 
This embargo provision in favour of bodies corporate was inserted by the first 
Sectional Titles Amendment Act,269 apparently after representations made by the 
                                                            
264 Per Ponnan JA in City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Mathabathe and Another [2013] 
ZASCA 60 at para 10. 
265 Act 95 of 1986. 
266 Section 15B(3)(a) of the Sectional Titles Act, Act 95 of 1986. 
267 As explained in the Rabie case, this is not a preference in the ordinary sense of being a ‘claim 
ranking in priority’ over a mortgage bond. 
268 See Nel NO v Body Corporate of the Seaways Building and Another [1995] ZASCA 83 for a 
general discussion of the embargo provision in favour of bodies corporate of sectional title schemes. 
269 Act 63 of 1991. 
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Institute of Estate Agents of South Africa for such protection on the basis that bodies 
corporate were suffering losses in the event of insolvency. It was the opinion of the 
South African Law Commission that it was ‘quite remarkable that the special 
protection was conferred at all’.270 
It should be noted that the embargo provision in favour of a body corporate is 
unfettered by a time limit.
271
 Van der Merwe
272
 argued that the embargo provision in 
favour of a body corporate should apply for a period of six months’ arrear levies 
only, and that limiting it to such a period balances the competing interests of, on the 
one hand, needing to provide a mechanism to bodies corporate to enforce collection 
of unpaid levies, and, on the other hand, protect the security interests of mortgage 
lenders.273 However, the Commission did not even agree with this shortened period 
and argued for the complete abolition of the embargo provision in favour of bodies 
corporate,274 which recommendation was not acted upon and the special protection 
persists. 
Under business rescue proceedings, where a sectional title unit is one of the 
assets of the company under supervision, there will therefore be an unlimited 
effective preference in favour of the body corporate of that sectional scheme for any 
and all arrear levies payable to it. 
7.3 Home owners’ association levies 
Home owners’ associations may come into being by virtue of the discretion of a 
competent authority to impose a condition requiring the compulsory establishment of 
                                                            
270 Op cit n 76 at para 7.11. 
271 However, cognizance must be had of the possibility of extinctive prescription in terms of the 
Prescription Act, Act 68 of 1969. 
272 Van der Merwe ‘Does the restraint on transfer provision in the Sectional Titles Act accord 
sufficient preference to the body corporate for outstanding levies?’ 1996 Tydskrif vir Hedendaags 
Romeins-Hollandse Reg 367. 
273 Ibid at 386-387. 
274 Op cit n 76 at 7.12. 
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such a home owners’ association before approval is granted for the subdivision of 
land. An example of this is section 29 of the Land Use Planning Ordinance275 
(‘LUPO’), which indicates that such a home owners’ association shall be a body 
corporate with a constitution which has its object the control over and the 
maintenance of buildings, services and amenities arising from the subdivision 
concerned, and shall have as its members the owners of land units arising from such 
subdivision, who shall be jointly liable for expenditure incurred in connection with 
the association.276 In terms of the conditions of establishment of a township register 
being opened under the so-called Transvaal Ordinance,
277
 a condition may be 
imposed to create a home owners’ association as an incorporated non-profit 
company.278 
The joint liability of members of a home owners’ association for the expenditure 
of that association are represented in the form of proportional levies paid by each 
member. These levies bear a very strong resemblance to levies payable to a body 
corporate of a sectional scheme. To provide a tool to assist such home owners’ 
associations with the collection of levies, it has become common practice to register 
conditions of title in the title deeds of members of home owners’ associations which 
effectively provide for the following: 
1. That compulsory membership of the home owners’ association in question is 
binding on successors-in-title of the land unit in question; 
2. That transfer of the land unit in question may only be registered in the 
Registry of Deeds upon submission of a clearance certificate from the home 
owners’ association consenting to that transfer; and 
                                                            
275 Ordinance 15 of 1985, which is applicable to the Western Cape, Eastern Cape and Northern Cape. 
Compulsory establishment of homeowners’ associations could also be a condition of approval of 
subdivision under the earlier Townships Ordinance, 1934 (Ordinance 33 of 1934). 
276 Ibid, s 29(2). 
277 Town-Planning and Townships Ordinance No. 15 of 1986, which is applicable in Gauteng, 
Mpumalanga, North West and Limpopo Provinces. 
278 Section 10 of the 2008 Companies Act; previously these were so-called section 21 not-for-profit 
companies under the 1973 Companies Act. 
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3. That such consent from the home owners’ association may not be 
unreasonably withheld, but may be done so if the member in question has not 
paid in full any and all amounts due by her to the home owners’ association 
in respect of that land unit. 
The ability of a home owners’ association to prevent transfer until the debt 
associated with a land unit has been paid to it is an embargo provision akin to s 
118(1) of the Municipal Systems Act279 and s 15B(3)(a) of the Sectional Titles 
Act.280 This similarity has been confirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in two 
very recent judgments,
281
 and it has been confirmed that the rights in favour of home 
owners’ associations by virtue of such title deed conditions constitute limited real 
rights that are capable of registration against the title deed. It was argued in the 
Willow Waters case – in comparing these rights in favour of home owners’ 
associations to statutory embargo provisions – that embargoes ‘serve a vital and 
legitimate purpose as effective security for debt recovery in respect of municipal 
service fees and contributions to bodies corporate for water, electricity, rates and 
taxes etc Thus, they ensure the continued supply of such services and the economic 
viability and sustainability of municipalities and bodies corporate in the interest of 
all inhabitants in the country.’
282
 
Of course, such limited real rights affording an effective preference to home 
owners’ associations will only be enforceable in such cases where such an embargo 
provision has been registered against the title deed. 
It is worth noting that any qualification of the embargo in favour of home 
owners’ associations will be dependent on the wording of the title condition in 
question, but it appears highly unlikely that home owners’ associations will limit the 
                                                            
279 7.1 above. 
280 7.2 above. 
281 Willow Waters Homeowners Association (Pty) Ltd v Koka and Others (two Amici Curiae 
intervening) [2014] ZASCA 220 (‘Willow Waters’) and Cowin NO and Others  v Kyalami Estate 
Homeowners Association and Others (two Amici Curiae intervening) [2014] ZASCA 221 (‘Cowin’). 
282 Willow Waters, para 25. 
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applicability thereof to a specific time period prior to the application for consent to 
the transfer. 
7.4 Observations 
It is clear that there is a long precedent in South African law to make statutory 
provision for the effective preference of certain specified unsecured creditors above 
secured creditors. Outside of insolvency these effective preferences in respect of any 
unpaid municipal rates and charges, body corporate levies and home owners’ 
association levies are unfettered by a time limit; and, as it stands, in insolvency only 
the effective preference of municipal debt will be subject to any qualification.
283
 
It is clear that these provisions involve the impairment of the right of a secured 
creditor in favour of a specified unsecured creditor on policy grounds, usually the 
public interest. It should be noted that, in the case of municipal debt and body 
corporate levies, these preferences are specifically imposed by unambiguous and 
clear legislative intent. In the case of home owners’ associations, the embargo 
provision forms part of the conditions of title of an immovable property and if the 
property in question is taken as security by a creditor, then it must be argued that the 
secured creditor in question is aware of the embargo provision and implicitly 
consents to have her right to proceeds curtailed. 
It is submitted that, in the context of business rescue, when considering granting 
a preference to post-commencement funders in priority to existing pre-
commencement secured creditors, such a provision should be defensible on policy 
grounds, and should likewise either be imposed by clear and unambiguous legislative 
intent (which should survive the scrutiny of constitutionality), or alternatively 
involve substantial consent on the part of a secured creditor to the deprivation. 
  
                                                            
283 See 7.1 above. 
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8. Conclusion 
It is submitted, with respect, that the ranking of priorities of creditors’ claims 
during business rescue proceedings as set out by Kgomo J in both Merchant West 
and Redpath Mining is incorrect. 
Wessels J said the following in Casserley v Stubbs:284 
‘It is a well-known canon of construction that we cannot infer that a statute 
intends to alter the common law. The statute must either explicitly say that it is the 
intention of the legislature to alter the common law, or the inference from the 
Ordinance must be such that we can come to no other conclusion that the legislature 
did have such an intention.’ 




‘It is a strong thing to read into an Act of Parliament words which are not there, 
and in the absence of clear necessity it is a wrong thing to do.’ 
On no occasion does the wording of section 135 refer to pre-commencement 
secured creditors, and if it was the intention of the legislature to alter the law as far as 
it relates to the distribution rules in South African insolvency law, it must explicitly 
state so or, as Wessels J said, ‘the inference…must be such that we can come to no 
other conclusion that the legislature did have such an intention.’  
If we utilise the approach to statutory interpretation set out by Wallis JA in 
Endumeni,286 upon a clear reading of the ordinary language of both sections 134 and 
135 it is possible to construct an interpretation of these two provisions that are not in 
conflict with one another, and which in fact is supported by the context provided by 
both the background and stated purposes of business rescue in South Africa, as well 
                                                            
284 1916 T.P.D. 310 at 312. 
285 Thompson v Goold (1910) A.C. 409 at p 420. 
286 See n 43. 
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as being consistent with the materials known to its drafters, being the best practice 
encountered in international jurisdictions. 
The structure of the two provisions in question, sections 134 and 135, 
resemble to a certain extent the structure of § 506 and § 507 in Chapter 5 of the US 
Bankruptcy Code. § 506 confirms the rights of secured creditors, while § 507 sets out 
the priority of unsecured claims.  
It is submitted that the correct ranking of the priority of creditors’ claims during 
business rescue proceedings should be as follows: 
1. The practitioner’s remuneration and expenses; 
2. Secured pre-commencement claims; 
3. Deemed employee post-commencement finance, pari passu; 
4. Secured post-commencement finance; 
5. Employee (unsecured) claims for remuneration that arose prior to business 
rescue proceedings commencing, pari passu; 
6. Unsecured post-commencement finance in the order in which they were 
incurred; 
7. Employee (unsecured) claims for remuneration that arose prior to business 
rescue proceedings commencing, pari passu; 
8. Other unsecured pre-commencement claims, pari passu. 
The above ranking compares favourably with the recommendations of 
international bodies such as UNCITRAL and the World Bank. A priority is 
established for post-commencement finance that allows repayment prior to ordinary 
pre-commencement unsecured creditors, and post-commencement finance providers 
are able to obtain security from a company in business rescue.  
It is undoubted that post-commencement finance is crucial for successful 
business rescues, and that the legislature foresaw that some form of incentive had to 
be offered to induce the a funder to provide such finance. This inducement was 
provided in the form of the preference provided to post-commencement funders over 
all pre-commencement unsecured creditors. However, it is clear that the legislature 
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did not go as far as providing an equivalent provision to §364(d) of the US Chapter 
11 proceedings, which allows for so-called ‘priming liens’.  
As discussed, there is a long precedent of statutory provisions that allow for the 
‘carving out’ of secured creditor’s interests in favour of unsecured creditors. If it 
really is the intention of the legislature to allow for pre-commencement secured 
creditors to have their real security in business rescue proceedings carved out in 
favour of post-commencement financiers, then such intention must be clearly and 
unambiguously expressed in the form of an amendment to Chapter 6. Of course, any 
such provision would need to pass constitutional muster, as the argument could be 
made that it amounts to arbitrary deprivation of property. 
In the absence of statutory intervention – which appears unlikely – it will fall to 
the courts to ensure that the considerable uncertainty that has been created in the 
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